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BLAMING VICTIMS is an appealing  evasion of responsibility,  especially 
when the victims are far from virtuous. But when sins are as heteroge- 
neous as those of the Latin  American  regimes  of 1980,  one wonders  how 
well the exemplary  mass punishment  fits the alleged individual  crime. 
Most Latin  American  economies, for a variety  of domestic  and  external 
reasons, in 1980-81  faced the need for reform  and  adjustment  to the new 
international  economic environment.  However, the response  was slow, 
and policy errors continued to be made. Yet the incompetence and 
torpor  of policymakers  do not fully explain  the depth  of the depression 
of the early 1980s in Latin America and the mediocre outlook for 
recovery. 
This paper will argue that what could have been a  serious but 
manageable  recession has turned into a major  development  crisis un- 
precedented  since the early 1930s  mainly  because of the breakdown  of 
international  financial  markets  and an abrupt  change in conditions  and 
rules  for international  lending. The nonlinear  interactions  between this 
unusual and persistent external shock and risky or faulty domestic 
policies  led to a crisis of severe depth  and  length,  one that  neither  shocks 
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nor bad policy alone could have generated.  Large capital outflows, in 
most cases encouraged  by unconditional  currency  convertibility,  pro- 
vided  a particularly  explosive environment  for  the interaction  of external 
shocks and  imperfect  policies. 
To make this central  argument  plausible  (proof  seems impossible),  I 
will review evidence from six Latin American countries: Argentina, 
Brazil,  Colombia,  Mexico-which  have the region's  largest  populations 
and  gross domestic products-and medium-sized  Chile  and Venezuela. 
These six countries  together  represent  at least 80 percent  of any signifi- 
cant Latin  American  economic aggregate.  The growth  performances  of 
the six countries  varied  before 1981.  Their  external  circumstances  were 
different, with some of the group being oil importers  and others oil 
exporters. Policy styles ranged  from decidedly interventionist  to mili- 
tantly laissez faire. Reliance on external  borrowing  varied. Clear-eyed 
hindsight  shows that the extent of policy errors  was also different  from 
country  to country. Yet all six had serious economic difficulties  during 
1982-83  and  faced a weak recovery during  1984. 
I will attempt  to imagine  how the future  looked to these countries  in 
1980. I will analyze and date the crisis, examining  the various  external 
shocks, domestic adjustment  policies, and resulting  economic perfor- 
mance of the different economies. In an econometric interlude  I will 
scrutinize separately three crucial relations in these economies: the 
import  function, the export function, and the determinants  of the real 
exchange  rate. 
The paper's last section will focus on financial variables whose 
performance  characterizes  the crisis of the early 1980s.  A discussion of 
the contrast between "national" external debt and private external 
assets will emphasize  the asymmetric  attitudes  that exist toward  those 
two sides of the Latin  American  balance  sheet. One  overlooks  important 
policy issues and redistributive  effects when both private and public 
Latin American  external debts are lumped  together  and when private 
(and sometimes even public) assets abroad  are ignored.  These consid- 
erations  indicate  that the debt crisis is not  just a North-South  issue; for 
several  Latin  American  countries  it is also an issue of the distribution  of 
domestic income and wealth. Many observers have marveled at the 
more-or-less  punctual  servicing  of Latin  American  debts  during  the early 
1980s,  a performance  in sharp  contrast  with  the 1930s;  however, "coun- 
tries" do not decide whether  or not to service debt-individual political 
actors do.  The paper addresses the issue of debt servicing with a Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro  337 
discussion  of these actors'  perceptions  of the costs and  benefits  of active 
or  passive default.  The paper  closes with  a review  of the meager  rewards 
to adjustment  during  1982-83,  likely  future  scenarios,  and  modest  policy 
proposals. 
The development  crisis in Latin America  is forcing a salutary  reex- 
amination  of the role  of the public  and  private  sectors  in capital  formation 
and other economic activities; receiving particular  attention is  the 
efficiency  and welfare  consequences of the many  functions  assumed  by 
public sectors during  the last half century. Nevertheless, the 1982-83 
crisis was centered predominantly  on the balance of payments  and,  on 
the balance of international  indebtedness. The paper will, therefore, 
focus on variables  impinging  strongly  on foreign  exchange  flows. 
Background to Crisis: Could It Have Been Foreseen? 
This section first  sketches the heterogeneous  pre-1981  performances, 
external conditions, and policies of the six countries under study and 
then identifies  from their pre-crisis history the vulnerabilities  and ex- 
cesses that may have led to the troubles of the 1980s. Several serious 
weaknesses are found, particularly  in Argentina  and Chile, the two 
countries most in favor with the international  financial community 
around  1980-81,  but  I argue  that  even in those countries,  the information 
available at the time suggested no crisis of the magnitude  witnessed 
during  1982-84. 
PRE-CRISIS  PERFORMANCE 
A perspective  on pre-crisis  performance  comes from  examining  trend 
growth rates for 1960-83 as well as for two consecutive seven-year 
periods: the prosperous  one from 1966  through  1973  and the troubled 
one from 1973  through 1980.1  Four countries  registered  impressive or 
respectable  rates  of GDP  growth  for the whole period:  Brazil,  Colombia, 
1. Space limitations  preclude  the extensive representation  of these trends,  obtained 
from the usual semilogarithmic  regressions. They were computed  from basic data at 
constant prices obtained from the United Nations Economic Commission  for Latin 
America,  which  in turn  relies on national  statistics;  and  from  the International  Monetary 
Fund, International Financial  Statistics  and Direction  of Trade, various issues.  Andres 
Bianchi  kindly  provided  the data  available  at the U.N. Economic  Commission  for Latin 
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Mexico, and Venezuela. The growth rate slowed during the second 
septennium  but  remained  reasonably  fast. (Mexico  had  a burst  of growth 
averaging  8 percent per year from 1978  through 1981.)  Argentina  and 
Chile  have grown slowly at least since the late 1920s.  Argentina  perked 
up during 1966-73 only to do miserably  in the following period; Chile 
did somewhat better in the 1970s, but its growth  was quite unstable. It 
appears  that very fast and very slow growth  are associated with insta- 
bility, both when the six countries are compared  for the whole period 
and when growth rates of a given country are contrasted  between the 
two septennia. With the exceptions of Colombia  and Venezuela, there 
is little evidence that the growth  of the 1970s  led to significant  improve- 
ments in income distribution  or social harmony;  on the contrary, the 
societies were left with internal  divisions not conducive to nimble  and 
resolute  domestic responses to external  shocks. 
Using  gross  fixed  investment  and  GDP  data,  one  can  compute  marginal 
capital-output  ratios to obtain a rough  index of the productivity  of the 
investment. With  three-year  averages  and investment  lagged  one year, 
the ratios  are as follows: 
1961-63  to  1971-73  to 
1971-73  1979-81 
Argentina  4.4  11.1 
Brazil  2.9  3.3 
Chile  3.8  5.0 
Colombia  3.1  3.3 
Mexico  2.5  3.1 
Venezuela  4.2  7.2 
Brazil, Colombia,  and Mexico-the  fastest growers-had the lowest 
marginal  capital-output  ratios,  and  the ratios  increased  only slightly  from 
one period to the next. Argentina,  Chile, and Venezuela not only had 
lower investment productivity (which could be due either to supply 
inefficiencies  or to poor management  of aggregate  demand)  throughout 
the years under study but also experienced a sharp decline in that 
productivity  after 1971-73. For Venezuela, disaggregation  into oil and 
non-oil sectors might  yield a better  picture  for the non-oil sector; non- 
oil output  has grown  more than OPEC-restricted  petroleum  production 
since the early 1970s. 
The correlation  for 1960-83 between the growth of GDP and the 
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countries.2  Contrary  to widespread  assertions, the trend  growth  of the 
purchasing  power of exports improved in four of the six countries 
between 1966-73  and  1973-80.  It is also noteworthy  that  Mexican  exports 
measured  in current  dollars grew faster than those of Korea between 
1972-74  and 1979-81. 
Coffee and oil prices did well during  the 1970s, so there is a sharp 
difference  in the behavior  of the terms of trade  for Colombia,  Mexico, 
and Venezuela on the one hand  and, on the other, those for Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile, which declined during  1973-80. In the same period, 
export volume grew rapidly  except for Colombia  and Venezuela. Also 
during 1973-80 Argentina  and Chile made impressive gains in export 
volume;  of the six countries,  only Mexico showed faster  growth  in both 
its terms of trade  and exports volume during  1973-80. Since at least the 
1960s  most Latin American  countries show a trend  toward  geographic 
diversification  of exports away from countries of the Organization  for 
Economic Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD);  typically,  that  trend 
has been accompanied  by the diversification  of commodities  exported. 
The geographic  diversification  of exports accelerated  markedly  during 
1973-80 in Argentina,  Chile, and Venezuela, advanced less in Brazil, 
and  was reversed  in Colombia  by the coffee bonanza;  Mexico shows no 
significant  trend  in diversification. 
Philosophies  guiding  economic  policy in our  sample  of countries  were 
as heterogeneous during  the 1970s as were performance  and external 
circumstances. At one extreme, Chile moved toward free trade, a 
balanced  budget,  and  laissez faire;  at the other, Brazil  remained  wedded 
to growth-oriented  military  statism,  which  had  shown  spectacular  results 
from 1966  through  1973.  Brazil  and  Mexico pursued  external  borrowing 
far  more  vigorously  than  prudent  Colombia.  Currency  convertibility  and 
capital  movements  were freer  in Mexico and  Venezuela  than  in Sweden 
but  were severely limited  in Colombia  and Brazil.  Import  controls  were 
dismantled  in Argentina  and Chile  while they remained  crucial  elements 
in the protectionist  arsenal  of Brazil and even Mexico; amazing  differ- 
2. The purchasing  power of merchandise  exports is defined  as the dollar value of 
exports  deflated  by dollar  import  prices or, more exactly, import  unit values. In other 
words,  it is equal  to the terms  of trade  multiplied  by export  volume. I conjecture  that  the 
purchasing  power of exports data, obtained  from the U.N. Economic Commission  for 
Latin  America,  are  more  reliable  than  data  giving  separately  the terms  of trade  and  export 
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ences in apparent  income elasticities in the demand  for imports  appear 
in our sample  during  1973-80. 
INVESTMENT  PERFORMANCE 
With this sketchy background  in hand, place yourself at the end of 
1980  (or even mid-1981)  and  try to detect signs of serious  trouble  ahead. 
There were indeed some troublesome signs. We have seen that the 
marginal capital-output ratios for Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela 
showed low investment productivity.  There was concern about some 
investment projects undertaken  by Latin American  countries: expan- 
sions in steel, petrochemicals,  and aluminum  alarmed  those connected 
with  those activities  in  industrialized  countries.  The  Brazilian  opposition 
muttered about "pharaonic  projects" in hydroelectric dams, atomic 
energy and gasohol facilities, railroads,  subways, and other infrastruc- 
ture. The Chilean  opposition  whispered  that all those shopping  centers 
in fashionable areas of Santiago could never generate the foreign ex- 
change needed to  service their external debts. Others focused on 
perceived imbalances between private and public investments and 
related  imbalances  between trade  and  nontrade  sectors. Investments  in 
nontrade  sectors were often financed  by external  debt, raising  questions 
about  the capacity  to transform  either  their  domestic  earnings  or the tax 
revenues they generate into dollars needed for debt servicing. In both 
Mexico and Venezuela, where such data  are available,  oil booms led to 
a faster growth  of public  than of private  investments.  Between 1972-73 
and 1979-80  Mexican  public investment  grew at an average  annual  rate 
of 11.1  percent  while private  investment  expanded  at a 6.7 percent  rate. 
The corresponding  Venezuelan figures were 10.6 and 5.0.3  Arms pur- 
chases and capital formation  undertaken  by the military,  which often 
controlled  major  public enterprises,  made many civilians  uneasy. Most 
of these doubts  were dismissed  as politically  motivated  or as motivated 
among foreigners by fears of competition. Indeed, there were few 
documented criticisms casting serious doubts on the ex ante social 
profitability  of specific projects;  even fewer criticisms  documented  at a 
disaggregated  level a decline in investment  efficiency  between 1966-73 
and 1973-80. 
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REAL  EXCHANGE  RATES 
The Argentine  real exchange rate with the U.S. dollar  was unstable 
around  an appreciating  trend  during  1973-80  even as the terms  of trade 
fell, and the government announced plans to liberalize imports. For 
Brazil the 1973-80 pace of real depreciation  with respect to the U.S. 
dollar  seemed small  given the deterioration  in its terms of trade;  Brazil 
moved  only slowly to adjust  both its real  exchange  rate  and  its domestic 
oil prices to the new international  relative  prices. During  1973-80  Chile 
not only faced a severe deterioration  in its terms  of trade  but  also took a 
leap  toward  free trade,  with nearly  all tariffs  down  to 10  percent  by 1980; 
it experienced only a weak and unsteady depreciation  trend over this 
period.  Indeed,  real  dollar  exchange  rates  became  more  unsteady  during 
1973-80  than they had been during  1966-73  for all the countries  except 
Venezuela,  with  the instability  particularly  high  for  Argentina  and  Chile.4 
The behavior  of real exchange rates during  the late 1970s  deserves a 
closer look. Table 1 presents  those rates  defined  with  respect  both  to the 
U.S. dollar and to a basket of currencies;  this table also includes data 
for  the early 1980s.  Argentina  and  Chile  adopted  policies of preannounc- 
ing  nominal  exchange  rates  with respect  to the U.S. dollar  in the hope of 
rapidly  reducing  inflation;  inflation  was reduced  but not fast enough. In 
Argentina  there was a remarkable  real appreciation  between 1977  and 
1980;  the real exchange rates for 1979-81 were more overvalued  than 
during the first and second Peronist administrations.  In Chile a less 
sensational appreciation  trend occurred between 1978 and 1981. The 
Brazilian  crawling  peg avoided a significant  appreciation  during  1975- 
79, while that  of Colombia  failed  to do so under  pressure  from  the coffee 
bonanza. In 1976 Mexico abandoned  its fixed nominal  exchange rate 
with respect to the dollar, held steady since  1954, to achieve real 
depreciations  in 1976 and 1977, only to let the oil boom lead to real 
appreciation  between 1977  and 1982.  Venezuela held its nominal  dollar 
rate steady with the help of abundant  foreign exchange reserves and 
managed  to keep its domestic inflation  close to that  of the United States 
4. The assertions regarding  the instability  of real dollar  exchange rates, like those 
made  earlier  regarding  the instability  of growth  rates, are based on the examination  of 
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Table 1.  Real Exchange Rates,  1975-83a 




measure  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
Argentina 
Dollar  280  208  234  179  127  100  129  305  288 
Basket  194  128  165  149  112  100  131  163  150 
Brazil 
Dollar  79  78  76  76  82  100  95  98  134 
Basket  76  74  74  78  88  100  85  82  95 
Chile 
Dollar  124  112  103  116  114  100  92  116  146 
Basket  140  120  99  111  112  100  83  94  110 
Colombia 
Dollar  127  125  106  103  100  100  100  100  106 
Basket  119  113  102  103  99  100  94  88  89 
Mexico 
Dollar  93  105  127  117  111  100  92  138  154 
Basket  103  109  120  115  107  100  91  132  141 
Venezuela 
Dollar  111  109  108  108  107  100  95  92  90 
Basket  115  111  105  107  108  100  92  85  80 
Source:  The real exchange rates with respect to  currency  baskets for 1975-80, United Nations Economic 
Commission  for Latin  America,  Economic  Survey  of Latin  America,  1981, Statistical  Appendix  (Santiago,  Chile, 
1983),  and forthcoming  issues for preliminary  data for 1981-83.  The real dollar  exchange  rate was calculated  with 
data from the International  Monetary  Fund, International  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues, line rf for nominal 
rates  and  line 64 for inflation. 
a. The real  rates  with  respect  to currency  baskets  were calculated  as a weighted  average  of the real  exchange  rate 
of each country  with its main  trading  partners.  The weights  used were the importance  of the trading  partners  in the 
import  and export  trade.  Inflation  was measured  by wholesale  prices  except for Chile,  where  consumer  prices  were 
used as adjusted  for 1975-78  by Rend  Cortazar  and Jorge  Marshall.  The real rates with respect  to the dollar  were 
defined  as the average  yearly  nominal  rate, corrected  by inflation  as measured  by consumer  prices,  in each country 
and  in the United  States. 
at least until 1979.  Both the real  appreciations  that  had  occurred  by 1980 
and  the practice  of pegging  to the U.S. dollar,  especially  when done in a 
preannounced fashion, were to  increase the vulnerability of  these 
economies to the events of the early 1980s.  The international  reserves 
that backed exchange rate commitments  were to prove evanescent, 
especially in countries  without  exchange  controls. 
DEBT 
By 1980 debt indicators presented a mixed but not necessarily an 
alarming  picture. Consider  debt first as a percent of exports (table 2). Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro  343 
Table  2. Principal  Debt Ratios,  Selected  Years, 1973-80a 
Percent 
Country  1973  1975  1979  1980 
Debt to total exports 
Argentina  74.3  87.0  86.7  90.9 
Brazil  107.0  139.0  197.3  169.7 
Chile  191.7  202.6  101.4  75.2 
Colombia  121.8  106.0  68.0  69.4 
Mexico  115.4  181.3  182.7  135.9 
Venezuela  29.2  12.5  60.1  48.9 
Interest  payments  to total exports 
Argentina  5.3  7.4  5.7  7.5 
Brazil  5.5  8.5  16.2  18.0 
Chile  2.5  8.5  7.5  7.7 
Colombia  4.9  5.1  4.6  4.8 
Mexico  7.1  13.1  17.8  15.5 
Venezuela  1.9  1.0  4.0  5.5 
International  reserves  to debt 
Argentina  57.4  27.2  135.2  91.3 
Brazil  86.4  30.1  27.7  17.4 
Chile  9.8  6.4  56.5  87.4 
Colombia  28.9  26.7  149.4  159.1 
Mexico  30.1  16.4  10.6  12.4 
Venezuela  207.3  790.4  134.5  122.9 
Source:  World  Bank, World Debt  Tables, 1983-84  (Washington,  D.C., 1984). 
a. Debt is defined  as external  debt that  has an original  or extended  maturity  of more  than  one year;  it comprises 
public  and  publicly  guaranteed  obligations,  outstanding  and  disbursed. 
For  Chile  and  Colombia  that  ratio  in 1980  was lower  than  in 1973.  Except 
for  Brazil  and  Mexico the ratio  appeared  quite  comfortable  in 1980.  Even 
for Brazil  and  Mexico the ratio  had  declined  between 1979  and 1980;  for 
Mexico there had also been a decline between 1975  and 1980. 
The percent of export earnings  taken up by interest  payments, also 
presented  in table  2, had  risen since 1973,  but  its absolute  level, even for 
Brazil and Mexico, was far from extravagant.  Last, international  re- 
serves were either higher  than or almost as high  as the external  debt in 
Argentina,  Chile, Colombia,  and Venezuela. In Brazil  and Mexico this 
indicator  had deteriorated  since 1973,  so that the growth  of debt net of 
reserves  since  the  early  1970s  could  have  been  regarded  as unsustainable. 
As "collateral" for Mexico's external debt, however, oil deposits in 
1980-81  appeared  as good as international  reserves. 
A Cassandra  would  have been right  about  debt  in 1980,  but she would 
have had  to rely on nonquantitative,  metaphysical  insights.  As early as 344  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
1979, perhaps, a case could have been made by, say, a prudent Brazilian 
planner to slow down debt and GNP growth but without precipitating a 
major depression.5  In  all  other  countries,  1980 debt  indicators  and 
aggregate measures of creditworthiness  did not look significantly worse 
than they  did in 1973. During 1980 one  could have  recalled that both 
borrowers and capital markets negotiated  the  1974-75 recession  suc- 
cessfully. 
It may  be argued that only  public and publicly  guaranteed debt is 
considered  in table 2 and that unguaranteed private debt was  already 
getting out of hand by 1980. This may be true ex post, but it is ahistorical. 
The explicit  and implicit rules of the game of  1980 were  that private 
agents were on their own when lending orborrowing, unless governments 
explicitly guaranteed their debt. Listen to Walter Robichek, then director 
of the Western Hemisphere Department of the International Monetary 
Fund, giving his personal views in Santiago, Chile, in 1980: 
In the case of the private  sector, I would argue  that the difference  between 
domestic  and  foreign  debt is not significant-barring  governmental  interference 
with the transfer of service payments or other clearly inappropriate  public 
policies-if  it exists at all. The exchange  risks  associated  with  foreign  borrowing 
are presumably taken into account as are the other risks associated with 
borrowing,  whether  it be from  domestic  or foreign  sources.... 
There  is understandably  greater  concern  with  certain  forms  of foreign  savings 
flows  to a developing  country  than  with  others.  These flows  can be grouped  into 
three broad categories, namely, flows into the private sector without official 
guarantee,  the same flows with official guarantee,  and flows into the public 
sector. The first  category  holds out the strongest  presumption  that the foreign 
savings will be profitably  invested and, hence, this category should pose the 
least potential  debt servicing  problems.  Bringing  an official  guarantee  into play 
diminishes  somewhat  the force of the discipline  that  tends  to ensure  that  foreign 
savings  are profitably  invested, although  it minimizes  the risk of governmental 
interference  with the transfer  of service payments. Overborrowing  in both of 
these categories is, therefore, very unlikely, provided  official guarantees  are 
given on a selective basis. With  this proviso, it is not necessary  to distinguish  in 
the context of this paper  between the different  forms  which the flow of foreign 
savings  into the private  sector can take.6 
5. The case in fact was made within Brazil. See Carlos  F. Diaz-Alejandro,  "Some 
Aspects of the 1982-83  Brazilian  Payments  Crisis,"  BPEA,  2:1983,  pp. 515-42. But see 
also comments  by Richard  N. Cooper,  arguing  that  in 1979  that  approach  would  have  been 
excessively  conservative  (BPEA, 2:1983, pp. 543-47). 
6. E. WalterRobichek,  "Some  Reflections  About  External  Public  Debt  Management," 
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Even during 1980 there was scattered concern that external debt, 
whether  public or private, had financed  consumption,  not investment. 
But many serious analysts concluded that the growth of debt in Latin 
American  and  other  less developed  countries  reflected  not unsustainable 
consumption  but increased investment, so that repayment  problems 
were not likely. Indeed, the international  financial  market  appeared  to 
recognize with creditworthiness  and low spreads the efforts made in 
capital  formation,  presumably  because both the level and the allocation 
of investment  appeared  sound.7 
Another  concern  during  1980-81  could  have been that  the public  debt 
was financing  not bad investment  projects  nor unsustainable  consump- 
tion but private  capital  flight.  (It is moot whether  capital  flight  is worse, 
from the viewpoint of national  welfare, than financing  arms  purchases 
and other wasteful absorption.)  Were public and publicly guaranteed 
borrowings  exceeding  current  account  deficits  plus  reserve  accumulation 
before '1982?  Table 3 presents thumbnail  summaries  of accumulated 
current  account deficits covering the period from 1974 through 1981. 
This summary  hides the fact that  Brazil  and  Mexico steadily  maintained 
large  deficits  throughout  that  period  and  that  the bulk  of the accumulated 
deficits  for Argentina  and Chile  occurred  from 1979  through  1981.  Table 
3 divides the current  account deficit into net factor payments  plus the 
deficit  in the rest of the current  account.  It may  be seen that  for  the whole 
of 1974  through  1981  Argentina,  Colombia,  and  Venezuela  had  surpluses 
in the current  account excluding factor payments; Venezuela with its 
then-monumental  reserves even had a surplus  on net factor payments 
and must have benefited  from the rise in interest  rates during  1980-81. 
Only Brazil, Chile, and Mexico obtained real resource inflows, on 
balance,  during  the heyday of the international  capital  market. 
There  is little evidence in table 3 showing  that  public  borrowing  was 
financing  massive net private  capital  flight.  For Argentina,  Mexico, and 
Venezuela, for which the World  Bank  Debt Tables  do not give data  for 
purely private debt, the last line in table 3 ("missing") is small even 
y Abiertas  al Exterior;  Estudios  Monetarios  VII  (Santiago,  Chile, December 1981),  pp. 
171-72.  Interestingly,  the refrain  of "too much  debt, too little  equity,"  which  has become 
quite  popular  since 1982,  is here  rejected  with  a sweeping  Modigliani-Miller  assertion. 
7. See for example Jeffrey D. Sachs, "The Current  Account and Macroeconomic 
Adjustment  in the 1970s,"  BPEA, 1:1981,  especially pp. 243-47; and Robert  Solomon, 
"The  Debt  of Developing  Countries:  Another  Look," BPEA,  2:1981,  pp. 593-607. -  ce  ce00  oo)  00  O N  o 
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when negative;  this suggests that net increases in private  assets abroad 
were close to net increases in external  private liabilities. ("Missing," 
like any residual,  is also picking  up all sorts of measurement  errors.)  For 
Brazil, Chile, and Colombia,  for which data on purely  private  debt are 
available  and indicate  recorded  inflows, the "missing"  line in table 3 is 
positive, suggesting  further  net  private  capital  inflows.  It could  be argued 
that  overinvoicing  of imports  and underinvoicing  of exports exaggerate 
current  account deficits, thus reducing  the residual  in table 3; on the 
other hand, some government  imports,  especially armaments,  may not 
be included  in official  data. 
Table  3 also shows that  Korean  virtue  must  be sought  elsewhere  than 
in emphasizing equity rather than debt in external financing;  Brazil 
shows far greater  reliance  on direct  foreign  investment, in relative  and 
absolute terms, than Korea or even Chile, whose regulations  on direct 
foreign  investors during  the years shown  were not particularly  punitive. 
RelatiVe  to its financing  needs, Chile  registers  an  enormous  net  nonequity 
capital  inflow  on private  nonguaranteed  account. 
Both Argentina  and Chile stimulated  an unsound expansion of do- 
mestic  financial  intermediation  during  the late 1970s;  banks  and  financial 
conglomerates  felt insured  by governments,  de facto if not de jure, and 
engaged  in extravagant  practices, including  massive borrowing  abroad 
from  foreign  banks  sharing  the enthusiasm  for  financial  deregulation  and 
the end of financial  repression.8 
It is true  that  in 1980-81  governments  and  public  enterprises  in several 
countries rapidly increased their spending. Mexico and Venezuela 
appeared  to believe together  with most international  experts  that  real  oil 
prices would continue upward and finance all sorts of development 
projects.  Militarists  in  authority  in  Argentina  and  Chile  armed  themselves 
for war (even as the "rational"  technocrats  of those regimes proudly 
stamped  out inefficiencies  in the civil sphere). 
Last, even observers who doubted the stability and perfection of 
international  capital  markets  as they operated  in 1980-81  reasoned  that 
if a major  international  economic  crisis  were  to break  out, indebted  Latin 
8. For more on this story see  Carlos F.  Diaz-Alejandro,  "Good-Bye Financial 
Repression,  Hello  Financial Crash," Journal of Development  Economics,  forthcoming. 
Financial  intermediaries  were  more  closely supervised  in  the  other  countries,  but  excesses 
and  supervisory  failures  were also seen there,  even in Colombia. 348  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
American  countries  could use their  bargaining  power to soften the debt 
burden,  very much  as they had  done during  the 1930s.9 
SUMMARY:  THE  VIEW  IN  1980-81 
By 1980-81  most countries  under  study  faced  the need  for adjustment 
and reform  policies even under the assumption  that the international 
economy would behave during  the rest of the 1980s  on average  as it did 
during  the 1970s.  Overvalued  exchange  rates, brittle  domestic  financial 
systems, and lax budgets, in addition  to the Sisyphus-like  struggle  with 
inflation,  called for urgent  action. Before the 1970s  international  inves- 
tors had too little Latin American  paper  in their  portfolios;  by the late 
1970s  this situation  had been largely corrected. After such a one-time 
stock adjustment,  the capital  inflows which could have been expected 
for the 1980s  were bound  to be smaller  than  those seen during  the 1970s, 
at least for Brazil and Mexico. It could also have been expected that 
higher  spreads  and  shorter  maturities  would  be needed  to induce  lenders 
to assume the greater  risks  foreseen for the 1980s.  '0 
Substantial  adjustments  and reforms  were thus needed in 1980  and 
1981;  but  nothing  in the situation  called  for  traumatic  depressions.  In the 
case of Brazil  some adjustment  was already  underway  certainly  by 1981. 
The inevitable  substantial  real  devaluations  in Argentina  and  Chile  were 
bound to cause significant  recessions and financial  stress, but as in the 
previous economic history of those countries, a "go" stage was to be 
expected shortly  after  a sharp  "stop." And very few observers  in 1981 
could have forecast that  Colombia,  Mexico, and  Venezuela  would  grow 
9.  See p. 35, the last paragraph,  in Edmar  L. Bacha and Carlos  F. Diaz-Alejandro, 
International  Financial  Intermediation:A  Long  and  Tropical  View,  Essays  in  International 
Finance 147 (Princeton University, International  Finance Section, May 1982). That 
paragraph  was written  by me. 
10. This was argued  by Paul A. Volcker in March  1980.  In the same speech he also 
stated: "The impression  I get from the data that I have reviewed  is that the recycling 
process  has not yet pushed  exposure  of either  borrowers  or lenders  to an unreasonable  or 
unsustainable  point  in the aggregate,  especially  for American  banks  whose share  in total 
bank  lending  to non-oil  developing  countries  in recent  years  has  declined  and  whose share 
of claims  on these countries  in total  assets has also declined.  But  problem  cases exist now 
and will no doubt continue to show up." Paul A. Volcker, "The Recycling Problem 
Revisited,"  Challenge,  vol. 23 (July/August  1980),  p. 13. Ironically,  banks  searching  for 
shorter  maturities  to cover against  the increased  risks of the 1980s  have ended up with 
quasi-perpetual  loans  in their  books. Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro  349 
during  the rest of the 1980s at rates significantly  below their postwar 
trend expansion. One may note that while Brazil, Colombia,  Mexico, 
and Venezuela were keeping at arms' length from the IMF, Argentina 
and Chile appeared to have excellent relations with that institution, 
which presumably  advised them on exchange rates and other policies. 
Indeed,  eminent  international  financiers  and  economists  often  presented 
Argentina  and  Chile  during  1980  and 1981  as examples  of sound  economic 
management.  Advice to these and other third world nations became 
widespread  (and  lucrative)  during  those years and included  some of the 
best known  New York  investment  bankers.  "  I  Few have credibly  claimed 
to have warned  the countries  of the impending  crisis. 
The Crisis 
I turn now to the crisis itself, first describing  the external shocks 
received  by Latin  American  countries  during  the early 1980s.  Then,  after 
examining  adjustment  policies undertaken  by the six countries  to deal 
with  the crisis, I review the dismal  economic  performance  that  resulted. 
THE  EXTERNAL  SHOCKS 
Table  4 summarizes  the key developments  surrounding  the crisis that 
emerged. Until 1981-82, new bank loans far exceeded net interest 
payments  in the countries  under  study. Only  a superficial  observer  could 
have labeled this situation a  "Ponzi scheme," as some have done 
recently. As already noted, during  the 1970s a stock adjustment  had 
occurred  in international  portfolios, making  up for about 40 years of 
insignificant  inflows of private nonequity capital into Latin America. 
From 1979  through  1981  new loans reached  more than  half the value of 
exports in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Even fuel-short Brazil and 
Chile  had  comfortable  amounts  of foreign  exchange  left over after  paying 
for interest and oil. That residual  (loans plus exports minus oil minus 
interest)  collapsed dramatically  between 1981 and 1982 in Argentina, 
11. Ann Crittenden,  "Consultants  to the Third  World:  Three  Investment  Banks  Join 
to Sell  Advice," New York  Times,  September  23, 1980,  p. DI. Table  4. Loans,  Exports,  Interest,  and Oil Imports,  1979-83a 
Billions  of U.S. dollars 
Country  and measure  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
Argentina 
Net new bank  loans  6.35  5.91  4.00  -0.77  1.19 
Merchandise  exports,  f.o.b.  7.81  8.02  9.14  7.63  7.71 
Subtotal  14.16  13.93  13.14  6.83  8.90 
All interest  payments,  net  0.49  0.95  2.96  4.40  4.98 
Oil imports  0.35  0.53  0.30  0.16  0.16 
Residual  13.32  12.45  9.88  2.27  3.76 
Brazil 
Net new bank  loans  5.08  6.51  6.29  6.48  1.38 
Merchandise  exports,  f.o.b.  15.24  20.13  23.28  20.17  21.90 
Subtotal  20.32  26.64  29.57  26.65  23.28 
All interest  payments,  net  4.10  6.31  9.16  11.35  9.56 
Oil imports  6.44  9.85  11.01  10.21  7.90 
Residual  9.78  10.48  9.40  5.09  5.82 
Chile 
Net new bank  loans  1.78  2.17  2.91  0.86  0.52 
Merchandise  exports,  f.o.b.  3.83  4.71  3.84  3.71  3.83 
Subtotal  5.61  6.88  6.75  4.57  4.35 
All interest  payments,  net  0.63  0.85  1.34  1.79  1.63 
Oil imports  0.79  0.73  0.60  0.25  0.19 
Residual  4.19  5.30  4.81  2.53  2.53 
Colombia 
Net new bank  loans  1.40  0.80  0.61  0.67  0.39 
Merchandise  exports,  f.o.b.  3.51  4.06  3.22  3.55  3.02 
Subtotal  4.91  4.86  3.83  4.22  3.41 
All interest  payments,  net  0.21  0.16  0.30  0.72  0.62 
Oil imports  0.30  0.52  0.57  0.62  0.49 
Residual  4.40  4.18  2.96  2.88  2.30 
Mexico 
Net new bank loans  7.49  10.24  14.49  3.45  3.95 
Merchandise  exports,  f.o.b.  9.30  16.07  19.94  21.23  21.40 
Subtotal  16.79  26.31  34.43  24.68  25.35 
All interest  payments,  net  3.01  4.45  7.00  9.63  8.80 
Residual  13.78  21.86  27.43  15.05  16.55 
Venezuela 
Net new bank  loans  5.68  2.80  0.97  0.37  -0.65 
Merchandise  exports,  f.o.b.  14.16  19.05  19.96  16.33  13.80 
Subtotal  19.84  21.85  20.93  16.70  13.15 
All interest  payments,  net  -0.31  -0.65  -0.92  1.13  1.72 
Residual  20.15  22.50  21.85  15.57  11.43 
Source:  Net  new  loans,  table 5,  Bank for International Settlements,  International  Banking  Statistics,  1973-1983 
(Basel,  April  1984).  Merchandise  exports  free on board  and net interest  payments,  U.N. Economic  Commission  for 
Latin  America,  Economic  Survey  for Latin  America  1983  (Santiago,  Chile,  forthcoming).  Oil  imports,  Inter-American 
Development  Bank,  External  Debt  and  Economic  Development  in  Latin  America:  Background  and  Prospects 
(Washington,  D.C., January  1984),  p. 43. 
a. Net new loans,  including  "involuntary"  or "concerted"  loans,  are  the changes  in end-of-year  external  positions 
(assets)  of banks  in the BIS reporting  area  plus some offshore  branches  of U.S. banks. Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro  351 
Brazil,  Chile, and  Mexico; in Colombia  and  Argentina  a severe contrac- 
tion had  already  occurred  during  1981. 
In Argentina  and Chile, the decline between 1981 and 1982 in the 
inflows  of loans, including  loans of an "involuntary"  nature,  exceeded 
the fall in exports. In these and other countries, the pro-cyclical  swing 
in loans turned  an already serious export decline into the worst crisis 
since the early 1930s  for Latin America. During  1982  and 1983  sharply 
increased  interest  outflows  exceeded net new loans  in all  countries  under 
study. In contrast  with 1974-75, the external  real shock was magnified 
by a financial  shock;  the latter  may  be more  durable  and  harmful  to Latin 
American  economies than  the former. 
It is worthwhile  to go beyond these simple  facts to examine  in greater 
detail  the timing  and  other  characteristics  of the decline  in private  capital 
inflows and the purchasing  power of exports. The financial  shock was 
already  visible in some countries  during  the first  half  of 1982.  The Polish 
debt crisis became apparent  during  the second half of 1981  and the war 
over the Malvinas/Falkland  Islands started  in April 1982. Net loans to 
Argentina  turned negative during  that fateful half even as lending to 
Mexico expanded  dramatically.  12 During  the second half  of 1981  and  the 
first  half of 1982  Mexico received $17  billion  in new loans;  in that  period 
the Mexican president  mocked those technocrats  who had warned  him 
about the limits to foreign borrowing.  The same year also witnessed 
record  lending  to Brazil. 
Even with "involuntary"  or "concerted"  lending,  the second half  of 
1982  through  the first half of 1983  witnessed an abrupt  collapse in net 
inflows except in the case of Colombia.  Those yearly inflows became 
negative  for Chile, Mexico, and  Venezuela.  Interestingly,  loans to Chile 
expanded  significantly  during  the second half of 1983, after sharp  cuts 
during  the first half; these data are consistent with rumors of banks 
applying pressure on Chile to guarantee ex  post the external debt 
undertaken  by private Chilean financial intermediaries  and with the 
Chilean  cave-in to this pressure  around  mid-1983. 
The decline in the absolute dollar value of exports preceded the 
decline in loans, except in Argentina,  where both declined during  the 
first  half of 1982. As shown in table 5, Chilean  and Colombian  exports 
had turned  down by the first half of 1981;  those of Venezuela by the 
second  half  of 1981;  those of Brazil  and Mexico by the first  half  of 1982. 
12. Data  on net new loans  obtained  as in table  4. 352  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
Table  5. Exports  and Loans, 1981-83 
Percent  change  from same period  in previous  year 
1981  1982  1983 
Country  and  First  Second  First  Second  First  Second 
measure  half  half  half  half  half  half 
Argentina 
Exports  21  7  -7  - 28  -11  18 
Exports  plus loans  2  -  14  - 38  - 60  8  72 
Brazil 
Exports  18  14  -10  -  17  6  11 
Exports plus loans  0  20  6  -21  -9  -  16 
Chile 
Exports  -  18  -15  -4  -6  -  1  2 
Exports  plus loans  5  -6  -7  - 55  - 50  80 
Colombia 
Exports  - 28  - 23  9  3  -9  4 
Exports  plus loans  -33  -  19  15  2  7  -23 
Mexico 
Exports  41  6  -12  30  9  -5 
Exports  plus loans  29  31  8  -55  -25  54 
Venezuela 
Exports  23  - 1  - 29  -  13  - 3  -  14 
Exports  plus loans  16  -10  - 25  -21  -13  -17 
Source:  Exports  refer  to merchandise  exports, line 70.d, IMF, International  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues. 
Venezuela,  line 70; exports  in bolivares  translated  into U.S. dollars  at 4.29 bolivares  per U.S. dollar.  Mexico,  line 
77.aad  through  1982;  1983,  line 70 (exports  in pesos) and line rf (average  dollar  exchange  rate).  Loans, see notes to 
table  4. 
Countercyclical  lending  was short lived or weak; the absolute value of 
loans plus exports  had  turned  down markedly  by the second half  of 1981 
for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. Brazil and Mexico 
escaped that decline until the second half of 1982;  for Mexico it came 
with a vengeance. 
One important  factor behind  the export troubles  of 1981-83  was the 
decline  in the terms  of trade,  which  all six countries  experienced  to some 
degree and which for some countries  approached  the declines suffered 
during  the early 1930s.  The Brazilian  terms  of trade  began  to fall in 1979 
and dropped  further  every year thereafter,  for a total decline of 38.5 
percent  by 1983  (table  6). The terms  of trade  for  both  Chile  and  Colombia 
declined  by about 25 percent over the 1979-83  period. For Mexico and 
Venezuela the 1981-83 terms of trade deteriorations  did not offset the 
gains obtained  in 1979  and 1980. Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro  353 
Table  6. Foreign  Trade  Indicators,  1979-83a 
Percent 
*  ~~~~~Cumulative  Change  from previous  year  change, 
Country  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1978-83 
Terms  of trade 
Argentina  1.5  16.2  - 5.4  -7.7  - 3.3  -0.5 
Brazil  - 8.8  -  15.6  -16.8  - 3.7  -0.2  - 38.5 
Chile  7.2  - 8.2  - 21.2  -  10.4  7.5  - 25.3 
Colombia  -  13.7  -2.5  -22.6  13.5  2.2  -24.5 
Mexico  11.7  24.0  -  1.2  -  17.9  - 3.7  8.3 
Venezuela  29.6  27.1  -0.8  0.1  - 7.4  51.4 
Export  volume 
Argentina  -  1.2  -  12.5  16.8  -5.6  9.6  4.4 
Brazil  12.0  22.3  25.0  -6.6  15.4  84.4 
Chile  19.1  9.1  -3.8  16.1  3.4  50.1 
Colombia  18.7  -  1.0  -3.8  1.2  -  11.4  1.5 
Mexico  17.6  23.6  18.8  22.4  12.6  137.7 
Venezuela  11.8  -8.4  - 5.4  -  13.8  -4.0  -  19.8 
Purchasing  power of exports 
Argentina  0.2  1.5  10.6  -  12.9  6.0  3.8 
Brazil  2.2  3.2  4.0  -  10.2  15.3  13.6 
Chile  27.8  0.1  -24.1  3.9  11.2  12.1 
Colombia  2.5  - 3.5  - 25.5  14.9  -9.6  - 23.4 
Mexico  31.3  53.3  17.3  0.6  8.4  157.4 
Venezuela  44.8  16.4  -6.2  -  13.8  -  11.1  21.3 
Source:  U.N.  Economic  Commission  for Latin America,  Economic  Survey of Latin America,  1983. 
a. Terms  of trade  are defined  as U.S. dollar  prices for merchandise  exports  f.o.b. divided  by dollar  prices  for 
merchandise  imports  valued  at cost, insurance,  and  freight.  Export  volume  covers merchandise  exports  only. 
Export volume did remarkably  well during 1982-83 given external 
circumstances,  particularly  in Chile, Mexico, and even Brazil. These 
three  countries  have expanded  export volume impressively  since 1978. 
Venezuela  followed  OPEC  volume  restrictions,  while  Colombia  suffered 
not only from the international  recession and the end of the coffee 
bonanza but also from the collapse of the oil boom in neighboring 
Ecuador  and Venezuela, countries  separated  from  Colombia  by porous 
borders. 
Data on export volume show that debt-ridden  countries  are making 
significant  efforts to carry  out the real transfer  of at least interest  costs. 
The data  also hint  that  this transfer  is partly  frustrated  by the worsening 
terms  of trade,  a worsening  which could  be endogenous  to some degree. 
By 1983 sharp real devaluations in most Latin American countries, 
combined  with domestic  recessions, led to a vigorous  export  push;  with 354  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
many countries engaged in the same efforts, the terms of trade were 
bound to suffer. While hurting  the transfer  process, this phenomenon 
helped the industrialized  countries in their fight against inflation by 
contributing  dirt-cheap  supplies  of primary  products  and simple  manu- 
factures.  13 
The 1981-83  decline  in  export  values  was accompanied  by a significant 
reversal  of the postwar  trend  toward  diversification  in the destination  of 
Latin  American  exports. With  few exceptions, there  has been a remark- 
able  collapse  of exports  to other  Latin  American  countries  and  to OPEC. 
Latin American  and third  world economic integration  was revealed to 
be a thin reed on which to lean in a time of crisis. For most countries, 
the United States has become the only major  expanding  market;  Euro- 
pean and Japanese stagnation or protectionism  is apparent  in Latin 
American  export  data.  14 
Nominal interest rates on foreign loans, which were higher than 
expected, are known to explain the lion's share of the increase since 
1979  in net interest  payments,  shown  in table  4.15 Less well known  is the 
fact that  when translated  into real  terms  using  price  indexes relevant  for 
Latin America, the rates on foreign loans reach extraordinary  levels. 
Since 1980,  nominal  dollar  price  indexes  for Latin  American  exports  and 
imports  have declined. For the whole region, dollar  export and import 
price (unit-value)  indexes used by the United Nations Economic Com- 
mission  for Latin  America  had the following  average  annual  percentage 
rates  of change: 
1965-66  to  1972-73  to  1979-80  to 
1972-73  1979-80  1982-83 
Dollar  prices  of exports  7.5  8.6  - 3.7 
Dollar  prices  of imports  4.2  15.6  - 1.1 
Average  dollar  prices 
for  exports  and  imports  6.0  11.9  -2.3 
Addendum 
U.S. wholesale  prices  3.7  10.3  6.8 
13. Although  at least some of the dirt-cheap  supplies  were kept out for protectionist 
purposes.  Spot sugar  prices in the "world  free market"  were 4.55 U.S. cents per pound 
on July 12, 1984;  the corresponding  (quota-protected)  U.S. price was 21.95 cents per 
pound  (Wall  Street  Journal,  "Cash  Prices," July 16, 1984,  p. 28). During  1974  the "world 
free market"  sugar  price  reached  a record  high  of 60 U.S. cents per  pound. 
14. Those data can be found in IMF, Direction  of Trade  Statistics, Yearbook  1984 
(Washington,  D.C., 1984). 
15. For a decomposition  of interest  payments  into those due to higher  debt and  those 
due to higher  rates  see Diaz-Alejandro,  " 1982-83  Brazilian  Payments  Crisis,"  p. 526. Carlos F.  Diaz-Alejandro  355 
Assuming  that  export  and  import  unit-value  indexes give an accurate 
picture of  price trends, we  can use  their average as  the relevant 
international  price  level.  16 While  in the two earlier  intervals  these prices 
rose somewhat  faster than U.S. wholesale prices, in the latest period 
they rose 9 percent per year slower. Thus the ex post real interest  rate 
paid  by Latin  America  during  the  early  1980s  becomes  about  9 percentage 
points  higher  than  the already  high  real  rate calculated  using U.S. price 
indexes. 
In sum, Latin American  exports in 1981  were already  feeling the in- 
ternational  recession in a cyclical pattern  that  stretches  back  at least one 
hundred years in the economic history of  these foreign-exchange- 
dependent  nations. Banks  had  become important  suppliers  of dollars;  at 
first  they continued  lending, to some countries  at an accelerated  rate, 
but then they decided to stop, thereby  curtailing  even short-term  trade 
credits. Apparently  the stampede  away from Latin  America  was led by 
banks with relatively small exposure to the region;  U.S. money center 
banks are said to have persevered and even to have expanded their 
already  substantial  exposure. Countries  without  large  reserves of inter- 
national  liquidity  faced severe payments  crises. 
The 1982  behavior  of lenders is difficult  to reconcile with collective 
economic rationality.  Even if new information  appeared  early in 1982 
suggesting  the wisdom of lower bank exposure in Latin America, the 
rational  path  toward  that  target  was unlikely  to coincide  with the abrupt 
one chosen. The swing in capital flows after mid-1982  indicates that 
either  lending  was too high  before, or that it was too low after, or both. 
Bank  behavior  during  1982  illustrates  the financial  markets'  vulnerability 
to crises; such crises have, at their  root, externalities  that  generate  gaps 
between private  and collective rationality.  As expounded  by theorists, 
lending  during  bad times takes on the character  of a public  good.  17 
Public  goods must  be supplied  by collective action;  this fact explains 
why since mid-1982  the Federal  Reserve, the U.S. Treasury,  the IMF, 
the Bank  for International  Settlements,  and  the large  private  banks  took 
coordinated  steps to create what I call an international  credit orderly 
16. The case of using  a weighted  sum  of import  and  export  dollar  prices  to deflate  debt 
or interest  payments,  rather  than  other  possible  deflators,  is presented  in Bacha  and  Diaz- 
Alejandro,  International  Financial  Intermediation,  p. 12. 
17. See Paul R. Krugman,  "International  Debt Strategies  in an Uncertain  World" 
(Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology, 1984);  and  Jeffrey  D. Sachs, Theoretical  Issues 
in International  Borrowing,  Studies  in International  Finance, 54 (Princeton  University, 
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marketing  arrangement.  But what may be seen from  the lenders' view- 
point as actions correcting  newly recognized  market  imperfections  (so 
vehemently  denied  during  ten  years  of discussions  about  the  international 
economic order) appears  from the borrowers'  viewpoint rather  like a 
credit cartel. A consortium  in charge of distributing  credit to remedy 
market failures should be expected to include borrowers as well as 
lenders.  18  Otherwise,  regulation  motivated  by a desire to correct  exter- 
nalities could spawn monopoly profits, a phenomenon amply docu- 
mented  in  the  history  of regulation  of many  industries  in  OECD  countries. 
In short, the  1982 collapse of a reasonably competitive, if flawed, 
international  capital  market  (at least for Latin  America)  constitutes  the 
major  external  shock to the region  during  the early 1980s. 
ADJUSTMENT  POLICIES 
Perhaps the most important  decisions adopted by Latin American 
countries  since mid-1982  have been the continued  servicing  of the public 
external debt, even with delays and arrears, and the provision of 
extraordinary  facilities for the servicing of the private external debt, 
which in some cases  has been explicitly socialized. This behavior 
contrasts sharply  with policies adopted  during  the early 1930s  by most 
of the same  countries.  The  question  of whether  to default  will  be reviewed 
below; the motivation for a non-laissez faire policy toward private 
external  debt will be briefly  discussed now. 
Even a government  strong  enough to ignore  political pressure  from 
private  lobbies may hesitate to allow the bankruptcy  of major  financial 
and  nonfinancial  firms.  The externalities  of bankruptcies  are  clearest  for 
private  financial  intermediaries;  but even the bankruptcies  of nonfinan- 
cial  firms  may  be viewed as aggravating  recessions  and  destroying  public 
goods laboriously built up over many years of  nurturing  "infant" 
corporations.  This is particularly  true  in countries  with relatively  scarce 
entrepreneurial  endowments and in which highly imperfect domestic 
capital  markets  and clumsy bankruptcy  laws could push sound organi- 
zations over the brink.  Most of what  can be said  in favor of the Chrysler 
18. As put by Charles  P. Kindleberger,  "the role of the lender of last resort is to 
provide  the public  good of stability,  rather  than  to serve  a class, caste, national,  or private 
purpose." Kindleberger,  Manias, Panics, and Crashes:  A History of Financial Crises 
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rescue would apply a fortiori  for the Grupo  Alfa and other such Latin 
American  rescues. Fears  that  foreigners  may  take  over  troubled  domestic 
firms  add to the case for bailouts. Note that in many  countries,  private 
local banks guaranteed  the loans of local firms  that borrowed  abroad; 
the bankruptcy  of those firms  threatened  local banks  and  raised  specters 
of either a major  financial  panic or wholesale acquisition  of the private 
sector  by foreigners. 
Why such publicly sponsored  rescues of troubled  corporations  have 
come  via subsidies  to the servicing  of their  external  debts  requires  further 
explanation. One reason is that the debt-servicing  burden following 
massive devaluations  is so large. Another is that private international 
banks have pressed Latin American countries to help corporations 
indebted to  those banks. The pressure has not been subtle. "San 
Francisco-based  Wells  Fargo  Bank,  for  instance,  has threatened  several 
times to declare  [Venezuelan]  public-sector  loans in default  if payments 
on the private debts weren't brought up to date.  "19 The Colombian 
government  was said to be under pressure during  1984  to take up the 
debt of some Colombia-owned  private  banks incorporated  in Panama. 
Now that banks can coordinate  their actions without fear of antitrust 
objections,  a threat  to squeeze short-term  trade  credits  has proven  most 
effective in bringing  reluctant  countries  to heel on the issue of private 
debts during  debt-rescheduling  exercises. 
Had one proposed in 1980-81 that no Latin American  private  firms 
be allowed  to borrow  abroad  without  government  permission,  one would 
have been accused of gross interventionism  or worse. Such complete 
control  over  foreign  borrowing  has  now  been  imposed  on Latin  American 
governments, even on those most committed to laissez faire, by the 
international  credit  consortium. 
The troubles  of indebted  Latin  American  enterprises  both public  and 
private  have been undoubtedly  aggravated  by the abrupt  and massive 
devaluations  of the early 1980s.  As shown  in table  1,  the  real  devaluations 
have  been larger  when measured  against  the dollar  than  against  currency 
19. This is a direct quote from Dorreen Hemlock, "Bureaucratic  Logjam  Delays 
Venezuelan  Debt," Wall  Street  Journal,  July 27, 1984,  p. 22. The article  also states that 
"at  first,  the banks  even refused  to negotiate  the government  debt  until  Caracas  approved 
subsidies  for $2.5 billion  of private  debt. Bankers  were willing  to start  talks this week, 
because, they say, they see signs the private-debt  impasse  is easing." The Venezuelan 
government  is said to have had the nerve to limit subsidies  to net debt-the  difference 
between  a company's  foreign  debt  and  its holdings  overseas-and there  the  troubles  began. 358  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
baskets;  nevertheless,  the devaluations  in Argentina  (since 1980),  Brazil 
(since 1982), Chile (since 1981), and Mexico (since 1981) have been 
remarkable.  In most countries  the devaluation  would loom even larger 
if it were  deflated  by money  wages;  that  is, real  wages  in terms  of tradable 
goods and services appear to have declined steeply. (During 1983 
Venezuela  adopted  multiple  exchange  rates  not reflected  in table 1.) One 
may note that few alert businessmen or foreign bankers should have 
been surprised by these real devaluations, even if their timing and 
magnitude  were uncertain. Spreads over LIBOR (London interbank 
offered  rate) were supposed  to cover, among  other  things, risks arising 
from  abrupt  change  in the business environment. 
As they were during  the early 1930s,  the devaluations  were more or 
less forced by circumstances  and came only after socially expensive 
dollars  from  central-bank  reserves were cheaply  sold in vain  attempts  to 
maintain  parities. Once the real devaluations  came, a battery  of other 
import-repressing  mechanisms  were reinforced  or reintroduced.  Even 
in Mexico and Venezuela, used to free currency  convertibility  in the 
past, "temporary"  exchange controls were enacted and have been re- 
tained:  the barn  door  was locked after  most of the horses  had  fled. Brazil 
and Colombia  had exchange controls  in place at the outset of the crisis 
and have thus managed  real devaluations  and other  policy changes  in a 
more  orderly  fashion. 
The harshness of import  and exchange controls during  1982-84 has 
varied  considerably  among  the six countries:  Brazilian  and Colombian 
import  controls  are  much  tighter  than  those of Chile;  Mexican  exchange 
controls  are administered  by officials  who abhor  them, in contrast  with 
officials in Argentina  and Colombia;  and the Chilean tariff, although 
raised  relative to pre-1982  levels, remains  as of August 1984  one of the 
lowest in Latin  America,  while the Brazilian  one is impenetrable. 
Monetary  and fiscal policies of the six have moved toward a more 
restrictive  stance. Monetary  expansion  fell substantially  behind  inertial 
and corrective inflation  during  1983  in Brazil and Mexico; table 7 also 
shows that domestic credit (to the private and public sectors) has 
expanded  less than  inflation  in Chile  and  Mexico during  1983.  The other 
three  countries,  which are without  standby  agreements  with the IMF as 
of August 1984,  showed less contraction  in real  money  and  credit  during 
1983.  Of these three countries, inflation  accelerated  alarmingly  only in 
Argentina;  during 1983 Colombia and Venezuela registered inflation Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro  359 
Table 7.  Credit, Money, and Prices in Second and Fourth Quarters, 1981-83a 
Percent  change  from same period  in previous  year 
Country  1981  1982  1983 
and  Second  Fourth  Second  Fourth  Second  Fourth 
measure  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter 
Argentina 
Credit  150  209  177  224  313  401 
Money  42  70  145  248  327  362 
Prices  89  123  130  203  314  404 
Brazil 
Credit  55  68  103  129  150  178 
Money  57  75  77  71  87  90 
Prices  106  106  99  98  120  175 
Chile 
Credit  41  30  58  75  26  11 
Money  29  -6  -  11  9  34  27 
Prices  23  11  5  19  31  24 
Colombia 
Credit  46  39  42  41  43  39 
Money  24  21  24  25  16  23 
Prices  27  27  25  25  22  17 
Mexico 
Credit  46  50  75  113  79  49 
Money  35  33  31  65  54  40 
Prices  28  29  44  88  115  87 
Venezuela 
Credit  1  21  56  22  12  6 
Money  14  10  4  6  11  21 
Prices  18  12  10  8  6  7 
Source:  IMF,  International  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues; credit,  line 32; money,  line 34; prices,  line 64. 
a. Credit  refers  to "domestic  credit." Credit  and money are at end of period.  Domestic  credit  plus net foreign 
assets equals money plus quasi money plus net other liabilities  of the banking  system. Prices refer to consumer 
prices,  period  averages. 
lower even than Chile's. All governments have pledged austerity in 
public  expenditures,  particularly  those involving  foreign  exchange. By 
mid-1984  only Argentina (and perhaps Colombia) lacked an overall 
stabilization  program  that could be regarded  as contractionary.  In all 
countries,  public  investments  in particular  have been sharply  reduced.20 
20. Comparable,  meaningful,  and  up-to-date  information  on  fiscal  performance  remains 
elusive,  to a large  extent  owing  to the inability  or unwillingness  of national  and  multilateral 
bodies  to  estimate  deficits  using  inflation  accounting  and  to separate  cyclical  from  structural 
deficits. 360  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
Real  devaluations  have had  important  fiscal  consequences,  increasing 
the real  burden  of debt servicing  and  reducing  customs  revenues. On  the 
other hand, where government  accounts for a good share  of the export 
sector, as it does in Mexico and Venezuela, real devaluations have 
generated  fiscal windfalls. 
OVERALL  ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE 
As in many  previous  stabilization  crises in Latin  America,  the balance 
of payments, particularly  the trade balance, has been turned around 
remarkably  fast, especially in countries  adopting  stiff devaluations  and 
monetary  restrictions;  on the other hand,  advances  in the battle  against 
inflation  have been disappointing  even among  the "well behaved." As a 
rule, real absorption  and GDP have done worst in countries with the 
sharpest  improvements  in trade  balances;  investments  and  imports  have 
declined precipitously  in countries  whose balance  of payments  perfor- 
mances generate euphoria  in the international  financial  press. Unem- 
ployment and poverty indicators  are scarce and not very reliable, but 
they appear  to be at higher  levels than  during  1980-81. 
Except in Colombia and Venezuela, impressive changes in trade 
accounts were made between 1980-81 and 1982-83 (table 8). By 1983 
Mexico and Venezuela had trade surpluses  exceeding their net factor 
payments  (interest  and profits)  abroad;  in Argentina,  Brazil, and Chile 
the  trade  surpluses  were more  than  half  of factor  payments  abroad  during 
1983.  Again excepting Colombia,  current  account deficits  in 1983  were 
below those of the three previous years; Mexico and Venezuela even 
had current  account surpluses, which are expected to continue during 
1984. Behind the impressive current account performance  lie sharp 
reductions  in real expenditures,  particularly  investment, and expendi- 
ture switching  induced  by new controls and drastic  changes in relative 
prices. Imports  have responded more rapidly  than exports to policies 
inducing  expenditure  reduction,  expenditure  switching,  and  expenditure 
repression. 
The view of the capital account of the balance of payments during 
1982-83  is murkier,  partly  owing  to less complete  or older  data.  Through 
the murkiness, however, one can see some alarming  developments. 
Consider  first  the changes  in  public,  private,  and  short-term  debt  between 
the end of 1981 and the end of 1983, and contrast those changes with Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro  361 
Table 8.  Trade and Other Balances,  1980-83a 
Billions  of U.S. dollars 
Country  and measure  1980  1981  1982  1983 
Argentina 
Trade  balance,  f.o.b.  -1.37  0.71  2.72  3.61 
Net factor payments  -  1.61  - 3.93  -5.11  - 5.86 
Other  services, net  -  1.79  -  1.49  -0.09  - 0.32 
Current  account  - 4.77  -4.71  -2.48  - 2.57 
Brazil 
Trade  balance, f.o.b.  -2.82  1.18  0.78  6.47 
Net factor payments  - 7.04  -  10.27  -  13.51  -  11.70 
Other  services, net  - 2.98  - 2.67  - 3.58  - 2.33 
Current  account  -  12.85  -  11.76  -  16.31  -7.56 
Chile 
Trade  balance,  f.o.b.  - 0.76  -2.68  0.06  1.01 
Net factor payments  -  1.03  -  1.60  -2.03  -  1.81 
Other  services, net  - 0.23  -0.54  -0.41  -0.42 
Current  account  - 2.02  -4.82  - 2.38  -  1.22 
Colombia 
Trade  balance,  f.o.b.  -0.24  -  1.54  - 2.42  -  1.64 
Net factor payments  -0.18  -0.40  -0.88  -0.68 
Other  services, net  0.26  0.05  0.10  0.17 
Current  account  -0.16  -  1.89  - 3.20  -2.15 
Mexico 
Trade  balance, f.o.b.  - 2.83  -4.10  6.79  13.68 
Net factor payments  -6.21  - 9.53  -  10.86  - 8.98 
Other  services, net  0.73  -0.44  -  1.25  0.62 
Current  account  -8.31  -  14.07  -5.32  5.32 
Venezuela 
Trade  balance, f.o.b.  8.17  7.84  2.75  7.16 
Net factor payments  0.33  0.57  -  1.53  -2.02 
Other  services, net  - 3.75  -4.39  - 5.44  -  1.61 
Current  account  4.75  4.03  -4.22  3.53 
Source:  Same  as table  3. 
a. Trade  balance  is defined  as merchandise  exports minus  imports,  both valued  f.o.b. Negative  values refer to 
debit  items  in the balance  of payments. 
earlier  trends.21  Increases  in private  and short-term  debt during  1981-83 
represent  a smaller  share  in the change  of total  external  debt  than  during 
21. This paragraph  relies on data presented  in Inter-American  Development  Bank, 
External  Debt and  Economic  Development  in Latin  America:  Background  and  Prospects 
(Washington,  D.C., January  1984).  "Public"  includes  disbursed  public  and private  debt 
with  official  guarantee  and  original  maturity  term  greaterthan  one  year.  "Private"  includes 
disbursed  private  debt without  official  guarantee,  maturity  greater  than  one year. Short- 
term  debt  includes  both  private  and  public  debt. Data  for 1983  are  preliminary  estimates. I-E 
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1975-81 (except possibly in Brazil, where data are especially shaky). 
The change is drastic  for Argentina,  Chile, and Mexico, countries  that 
relied  heavily on private  and short-term  debt before 1982.  The Mexican 
data for 1982-83 dramatize  what appears  to have occurred  in several 
other  countries  as well: a good share  of the increase  in registered  public 
debt during those two years went either to "clean up" unregistered 
public  short-term  debt  or to cover reductions  in registered  private  sector 
external  liabilities,  whether  long or short  term. 
Combining  the data on long-term  debt (short-term  debt cannot be 
divided  into private and public)  with current  account results for 1982- 
83, one obtains astonishing  estimates  for previously  unrecorded  short- 
term public debt plus net unregistered  private capital outflows for 
Mexico and Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, for Argentina  and Chile. 
These are presented in table 9, where the large sums categorized as 
"missing" can be contrasted  with the estimates  for earlier  years given 
in table 3. Only Brazil and Colombia,  with their traditional  and creaky 
exchange controls, appear to have escaped unregistered  short-term 
public indebtedness  or massive capital  flight  during  1982-83.22  Table 9 
also shows that  during  1982-83  only Colombia  experienced  anet resource 
inflow, defined as a deficit in the current account excluding factor 
payments. 
The worst aspect of Latin American  macroeconomic  performance 
during  1982  and 1983  is not to be found so much in the contraction  of 
absorption  (total expenditures)  and output,  bad as those were, particu- 
larly  in per capita terms;  the worst was the violent reduction  in invest- 
ment, which impaired  not only present  but  future  growth,  even granting 
the existence of substantial  excess capacity. The oil countries  have not 
escaped savage cutbacks in capital  formation;  only Colombia  escaped 
this trend  during  1982-83  (table 10). Among the components  of invest- 
ment, machinery  and equipment  was especially weak in most countries 
22. The U.N. Economic  Commission  for Latin  America  estimates  "errors  and  omis- 
sions" for the all-Latin  America  balance  of payments  at $17  billion  for 1982  plus 1983;  the 
sum  for 1980  plus 1981  was  $16  billion.  See U.N. Economic  CommissionforLatin  America, 
Adjustment  Policies and Renegotiation  of the External  Debt, E/CEPAL/SES.20/G.17 
(New York, February  22, 1984),  table 2, p. 11. The Bank  for International  Settlements 
estimates that some $50 billion flowed out of Latin America  between 1978 and 1982 
(Economist,  June 23, 1984, p. 73). The conceptual bases for these estimates differ, 
however,  from  those in table  9. Nevertheless,  the case can be made  that  the methodology 
used in table 9 would reveal even greater  capital  flight  if 1981  had been combined  with 
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and only Colombia sensibly expanded labor-intensive construction 
activity that did not use imports. Table 10 also shows remarkable 
contractions  in import  volume  between 1980-81  and 1982-83  for Argen- 
tina,  Chile,  and  Mexico and, to a lesser extent, for Brazil  and  Venezuela. 
Colombia,  drawing  on reserves accumulated  during  the coffee bonanza, 
managed  to expand  import  volume  during  1982-83.  Except in Colombia, 
absorption  declined  no less than  total  output;  Chile's  declines  in absorp- 
tion and consumption  are the steepest. Argentine  and Brazilian  macro- 
economic indicators  would look worse if 1982-83  were compared  with 
only 1980. 
It could be that during  1982-83, aggregate  supply  in Latin  American 
countries declined more than the reductions shown in table 10 for 
aggregate  demand;  the region, after  all, experienced  low terms  of trade 
and less favorable external credit. Capacity  built up before 1982  may 
have become obsolete owing to  abrupt changes in relative prices. 
Persistent inflation during 1982-83 (shown in table 7) could thus be 
blamed  on excess demand  presumably  generated  by the public sector. 
But this story seems unpersuasive,  particularly  in explaining  the high 
levels of Brazilian  and Mexican inflations  during  1983  and the first  half 
of 1984. Those who call for further  reductions  in aggregate  demand  in 
Brazil  and  Mexico are  likely  to be more  interested  in beefing  up the trade 
surpluses of those countries than in eliminating  inflation.  Inflation  is 
likely to persist, driven  in the short  run  by necessary  changes  in relative 
prices (such as the real devaluation)  as well as by other  inertial  factors. 
The  coexistence of a "favorable"  current  account  and  very  high  inflation 
in both Brazil and Mexico during 1983 and early 1984 erodes the 
credibility  of those  who argue  that  elimination  of inflation  is indispensable 
for improving  the balance of payments. The performance  of these two 
countries  during  1983  also casts doubt on the universal  applicability  of 
the formula  so popular  among  some staff  members  of the IMF  that "the 
current  account  deficit  equals  the budget  deficit." 
Declines in aggregate absorption  and output appear to have been 
accompanied  by changes in income and wealth  distribution,  although  it 
is not possible to quantify  these shifts. Producers  of exportables  and 
import-competing  goods and holders of net dollar assets have reaped 
windfall  gains  from  the real  devaluations.  Producers  of nontraded  goods, 
most wage earners, and those with net dollar  liabilities (including  the 
public sector) seem to have borne most of the burden  of adjustment. 366  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
Scattered evidence suggests increases in unemployment  and in the 
number  of persons below the poverty line. In Brazil there have been 
reports  of a decline in per capita  food consumption  to levels below that 
of 1980. 
As may be seen in the following year-to-year  percentage  changes, 
industrial  real  wages  fell sharply  during  1983  in  Brazil,  Chile,  and  Mexico; 
the  lame-duck  Argentine  military  government,  after  years  of suppressing 
real  wages, engineered  a destabilizing  increase  during  1983.23 
Cumulative, 
1981  1982  1983  1980-83 
Argentina  - 11  - 10  29  3 
Brazil  6  7  -12  1 
Chile  12  -3  - 11  -4 
Colombia  0  4  3  7 
Mexico  3  - 1  - 25  - 24 
Venezuela  -3  3  -3  -3 
The gap between gross national  product  and  GDP  reached  levels not 
witnessed  since the 1920s  in most  countries.  Net factor  payments  abroad 
(interest plus profits) as a percent of GDP during 1982-83 may be 
estimated  at 6 for Argentina,  5 for Brazil, more  than 10  for Chile, and 4 
for Mexico. These percentages, of course, would be higher if one 
compared  net factor  payments  abroad  with domestic savings. 
The 1982-83  crisis, which in Argentina  and Brazil  was clearly  visible 
already  in 1981,  has had  negative  repercussions  beyond  those registered 
in national  accounts and social indicators.  Domestic financial  systems 
have been deeply shaken. Many financial  and nonfinancial  firms  in the 
private  sector are bankrupt,  either de facto or de jure. In many cases, 
government  "interventions"  in those firms  have left their  legal status  in 
limbo,  further  reducing  investment  incentives. The precarious  status  of 
domestic  financial  intermediaries  has reduced  incentives  to save and  has 
induced  further  capital  outflows  by domestic  residents.  Sundry  financial 
scandals involving previously respected personalities, together with 
bankruptcies  and  capital  flight,  have  eroded  the  legitimacy  ofthe previous 
"mixed" Latin American  development  model. Almost a whole genera- 
tion of national entrepreneurs  and financiers has been discredited; 
23. Data  from  International  Labor  Office,  PREALC  Newsletter,  no. 4 (August  1984), 
p. 4. These data cover mainly  workers  in large  industrial  establishments.  PREALC  (the 
International  Labor  Office  branch  in Latin  America)  conjectures  that the real wages for 
other  workers  have suffered  far  greater  deterioration  than  those shown  here. Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro  367 
alternatives  to them, besides foreign ones or those tainted by illegal 
activities, are not easily found. 
To summarize,  the performance  of the real  Latin  American  economy 
since 1981  has been dominated  by the balance of payments, which in 
turn  has been dominated  by the need to service debt and obtain some 
fresh external  loans. A few hairs wagged the tail that wagged the dog. 
The  contrast  with  the early 1930s  is interesting:  the external  shocks were 
then  even more  severe than  those of the early 1980s,  but  per capita  GDP, 
absorption, and especially manufacturing  output performed  then no 
worse than  during  the early 1980s,  at least in Argentina,  Brazil,  and  even 
Colombia.24  So far, the 1980s  crisis has not had  the positive side benefits 
of the 1930s  crisis, such as greater  self-reliance  in the financing  of capital 
formation,  new public and private  institutions,  and a new crop of local 
entrepreneurs. 
Three Crucial Functions: An Econometric  Interlude 
Three  important  variables,  discussed above, deserve closer scrutiny: 
import  volume, exports, and  the real  exchange  rate.  What  follows should 
help to place their recent and somewhat dramatic  behavior within a 
longer-term  context and to explore whether  that behavior  can be "ex- 
plained" by other, more-or-less exogenous variables. No  complete 
model will be presented;  but the reduced-form,  single-equation  regres- 
sions of this section may clarify whether the recent cycle is much 
different  from previous ones and what recent changes imply for the 
future. 
IMPORT  FUNCTIONS 
All economies under study operated under import (and exchange) 
controls during part or all of  1960-83. Under these circumstances, 
estimating  import  functions  is a difficult  affair.  Table  11  presents  a rough- 
and-ready  attempt  to probe  behind  the steep  fall in import  volume  during 
recent years: the major hypothesis is that different components of 
24. SeeCarlosF. Diaz-Alejandro,  "Storiesofthe 1930sforthe 1980s,"inPedroAspe 
Armella  and  others,  eds., Financial  Policies and the World  Capital  Market:  The  Problem 
ofLatinAmerican  Countries  (University  of Chicago  Press, 1983),  pp.  7-9. The  performance 
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Table  11. Regressions  for Import  Propensities  from Investment  and Other  Absorption, 
1960  through  1982  or 1983a 
Independent 
variable  Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Mexico  Venezuela 
Intercept  -1030  299  -428  150  -1323  -  1237 
(-1.30)  (0.92)  (-3.13)  (0.87)  (-5.57)  (-7.30) 
Investment 
in machinery  0.34  0.40  0.68  1.50  0.67  0.52 
and equipment  (1.68)  (5.70)  (4.05)  (9.37)  (12.21)  (5.57) 
Other  absorption  0.09  0.03  0.11  -0.09  0.10  0.38 
(1.66)  (1.97)  (4.24)  (-2.15)  (5.64)  (8.81) 
Trend  - 54  -120  7  23  - 340  -  174 
(-1.49)  (-1.85)  (1.54)  (1.09)  (-8.35)  (-6.80) 
Summary  statistic 
Rj2  0.55  0.93  0.90  0.98  0.99  0.99 
Autoregressive 
parameter  -0.58  -0.45  -0.45  0.08  0.22  -0.11 
Degrees 
of freedom  19  18  18  18  19  18 
Source:  Basic merchandise  import  and national  accounts  data, both expressed  in U.S. dollars  at 1970  prices, 
obtained  as explained  in text note 1. 
a. Dependent  variable  is import  volume.  Annual  data. Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
absorption have very different marginal  import propensities, and in 
particular,  investment  in machinery  and  equipment  is presumed  to have 
the highest import component of all major  absorption  categories. Be- 
cause disaggregated  import  volume data  are not available  for the whole 
period, the hypothesis has been tested indirectly  by making  all import 
volume  depend  on the different  absorption  components. 
The fits shown in table 11 are remarkably  good; the regressions 
indicate  that investment  in machinery  and equipment  induces  far more 
imports than other expenditures, even in countries with the most 
advanced  domestic capital  goods industries  (Brazil  and Mexico). Even 
if one discounts  these results  somewhat  (especially  those for Colombia), 
they help to explain the brutal 1982-83 decline in imports. Squeezing 
investment, especially in machinery  and equipment,  is an "effective" 
way to reduce  imports  in semi-industrialized  economies  and  may  obviate 
the need to further  squeeze other absorption  for balance of payments 
reasons.  A recovery  of growth,  particularly  one that  expands  investment 
beyond  housing  and  structures,  would  require  sharp  increases  in  imports, 
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Table  12. Regressions  for Exchange  Rate Elasticity  of Imports, 
1960  through  1982  or 1983a 
Independent 
variable  Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Mexico  Venezuela 
Intercept  -0.04  -0.11  -0.01  -0.08  -0.16  -0.07 
(-1.19)  (-2.34)  (-0.67)  (-1.38)  (-3.33)  (-3.21) 
Change  in In 
of investment 
in machinery  0.54  0.14  0.31  1.20  0.31  0.37 
and equipment  (4.14)  (1.37)  (3.08)  (4.37)  (1.63)  (4.01) 
Change  in In 
of other  1.32  2.38  1.27  1.63  3.16  1.94 
absorption  (3.04)  (3.77)  (4.88)  (1.42)  (3.47)  (5.14) 
Change  in In 
of real  -0.07  - 0.78  -0.26  0.03  -0.43  -0.61 
exchange  rate  (-  1.05)  (-2.50)  (-  1.88)  (0.08)  (-2.39)  (-3.29) 
Change  in In 
of real 
exchange  rate,  -0.38  -0.32  ...  .  ...  ... 
lagged  (-5.51)  (-1.01) 
Summary  statistic 
Rj2  0.90  0.56  0.85  0.60  0.90  0.85 
Autoregressive 
parameter  -0.41  -0.16  -0.00  0.23  -0.38  -0.01 
Degrees 
of freedom  17  16  17  17  18  17 
Source:  See tables 1 and 11. 
a. Dependent  variable  is the change  in the natural  log of import  volume.  Annual  data.  Real dollar  exchange  rate, 
as in table 1. Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
The regressions of table 11, which were specified so as to sort out 
separate  import  propensities,  were not suited  for  estimating  the elasticity 
of imports with respect to the real exchange rate. Estimates of this 
elasticity are made with the logarithmic  regressions  presented  in table 
12.  Those coefficients  may be picking  up not  just expenditure-switching 
effects of changes in relative prices but also the import-repressing 
consequences of tighter controls adopted together with real deprecia- 
tions. (It is assumed that the contemporaneous  real exchange  rate may 
be taken  as exogenous and independent  of import  volume.) In spite of 
these caveats, the estimates are reasonably  good and give some hope 
that the import substitution induced by  1982-83 policies will be a 
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table 11 and the intercept  in table 12 indicate  significant  secular  import 
substitution  for Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. 
Other  import  functions  were estimated  by relying  on aggregates  such 
as GDP, all absorption,  industrial  output, consumption,  and all invest- 
ment. The regressions  of tables 11  and 12  not only yield the best fits but 
also make the most sense. Import elasticities with respect to simple 
aggregates  such as GDP or all absorption  are extravagantly  high. For 
detailed projections, an even more disaggregated  approach  would be 
desirable. For example, Brazilian  import  behavior  will be significantly 
influenced  by domestic  oil and  other  fuel production  and  by advances  in 
other lumpy import-substituting  activities such as those in nonferrous 
metals. 
EXPORT  FUNCTIONS 
Domestic policies as well as sundry internal and external shocks 
influence  Latin American  export earnings.  A complete examination  of 
export performance should disaggregate  by goods and markets the 
external  demand  and  domestic supply  of major  export  items. The small- 
country  assumption  is convenient  for purposes  of modeling  and  estima- 
tion, but it is probably  not quite accurate,  especially for the conditions 
of the early 1980s.  A complete specification  of the export sector would 
involve quota-constrained  demand  functions  as well as supply  schedules 
sensitive to degrees  of domestic  capacity  utilization.  But such a study  is 
beyond the scope of this paper, which will limit itself to estimating  a 
reduced  form  of the export  functions. 
The  celebrated  Cline  study  started  a  fruitful  controversy  on the  precise 
link  between the growth  of industrialized  countries,  on one side, and  the 
expansion of exports from developing  countries, on the other.25  Table 
13  represents  my contribution  to that  debate. The dependent  variable  in 
table 13  is the  percentage  change  in the  purchasing  power  of merchandise 
exports. As already  noted, the purchasing  power of exports is equal to 
25. William  R. Cline, International  Debt and the Stability  of the World  Economy, 
Policy Analyses in International  Economics,  4 (Washington,  D.C.: Institute  for Interna- 
tional  Economics,  September  1983).  See also Albert  Fishlow, "Coping  with  the Creeping 
Crisis  of Debt," Working  Paper  181  (University  of California  at Berkeley,  Department  of 
Economics, February  1984);  and Rudiger  Dornbusch  and Stanley  Fischer, "The World 
Debt  Problem"  (Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology,  Department  of Economics,  May 
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Table 13.  Regressions for Purchasing Power of Merchandise Exports, 
1960 through 1983a 
Independent 
variable  Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Mexico  Venezuela 
Intercept  -7.16  - 3.23  -11.40  -1.38  15.75  17.95 
(-1.17)  (-0.61)  (-1.49)  (-0.21)  (2.22)  (1.30) 
OECD GNP  3.40  2.65  3.70  1.59  -1.35  - 3.18 
growth  (2.32)  (2.10)  (2.06)  (1.00)  (-0.80)  (-0.92) 
OECD GNP 
acceleration,  4.60  1.34  4.58  0.74  2.54  4.56 
lagged  (3.14)  (1.08)  (2.36)  (0.48)  (1.53)  (1.43) 
Real exchange rate  0.11  0.57  0.70  0.10  0.10  -0.13 
change, lagged  (1.40)  (1.95)  (2.17)  (0.24)  (0.41)  (-0.15) 
Summary  statistic 
R2  0.57  0.38  0.47  0.09  0.12  0.12 
Durbin-Watson  1.94  2.12  2.21  2.24  1.12  1.82 
Degrees 
of freedom  19  19  18  19  19  18 
Source: Basic export data, U.N. Economic  Commission  for Latin America.  Industrial  countries'  growth  rates, 
IMF,  International  Financial  Statistics, Yearbook  1983. 
a. Dependent  variable  is the percent  change  in the purchasing  power  of merchandise  exports  (see text). Annual 
data.  Real  dollar  exchange  rates, as in table 12. Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
the terms  of trade  multiplied  by export  volume;  it may also be expressed 
as the current  dollar values of exports deflated  by the dollar  prices of 
imports. Other researchers have obtained mediocre results trying to 
explain  separately  the terms  of trade  and  export  volume;  so did  I. Doubts 
about  the quality  of the separate  indexes strengthen  the case for making 
the  purchasing  power  of exports  the variable  to be analyzed,  even though 
this variable  is far  from  ideal.26 
Another controversial aspect of the Cline estimates involved the 
extent to which increasing  geographic  diversification  of Latin  American 
export markets before 1982 biased the estimates for export elasticity 
with respect to growth in OECD countries. I tried regressions (not 
shown) in which the independent  variable  was the average share of a 
country's exports going to OECD countries during  the previous three 
26. OPEC  actions, not represented  in the regressions,  will influence  both industrial 
country  growth  and  the terms  of trade  of oil importers  and  oil exporters  in Latin  America, 
generating  spurious  correlations  of unknown  size. The length  of the period  covered  in the 
regressions  offers  modest  reassurance  on this point. 372  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
years. The estimated coefficients were negative for Argentina,  Brazil, 
Chile, and  Colombia,  but had t-statistics  no higher  than 1.3. For Mexico 
and Venezuela, t-statistics  were greater  than  2.1, but the coefficient  for 
the OECD countries' lagged share  in exports was positive. For Argen- 
tina, Brazil, Chile, and  Colombia,  the introduction  of this variable  in the 
regressions  raised the coefficient  for GNP growth  in OECD countries. 
Pending  more-disaggregated  export functions (OECD  versus the rest), 
the results of table 13  appear  preferable  to those using  ad hoc dummies. 
An exploration  of the independent  impact  of real  dollar  interest  rates on 
the purchasing  power of Latin  American  exports, operating  presumably 
via the terms of trade  and separately  from  changes  in OECD  GNP, also 
yielded insignificant  results. 
The elasticity of exports with respect to contemporaneous  OECD 
growth  is in the range  of 2.6 to 3.7 for non-oil  countries  not  heavily  reliant 
on coffee. This surprisingly  high elasticity includes volume effects as 
well as terms  of trade  effects of OECD  growth  on exports. The acceler- 
ation of OECD GNP during  the previous year (that  is, the difference  in 
the OECD growth rate between t -  2 and t -  1) also registers significant 
coefficients for Argentina  and Chile. The regressions  for Mexico and 
Venezuela show that when OECD growth declines, the purchasing 
power of Mexican  and Venezuelan  exports  increases. Given  conditions 
in the oil market,  the specification  in these equations  is highly  question- 
able, because causation is likely to be opposite to that implied  by the 
regressions. 
Real exchange rate changes, lagged one year to avoid simultaneity 
problems,  among  other  reasons, influence  export  performance  in Brazil, 
Chile, and less clearly in Argentina.  There  are, of course, other export- 
promotion  policies not reflected  in the real  exchange  rate, and there  are 
other definitions  for the real exchange rate, such as those using wages 
as deflators, which may yield better results. The results for Colombia 
are disappointing;  other studies have yielded significant  coefficients  for 
the effective exchange rate variable  when nontraditional  exports were 
examined separately.27  For the case of Brazil, the coefficient for the 
27. See Carlos  F. Diaz-Alejandro,  Foreign Trade  Regimes and Economic  Develop- 
ment:  Colombia  (New York:  Columbia  University  Press, 1976),  especially  chap. 2. For a 
more recent study, also showing  the responsiveness  of the supply  of Colombian  nontra- 
ditional  exports  to incentives,  see Leonardo  Villar  G., "Determinantes  de la evoluci6n  de 
las exportaciones  menores  en Colombia,  1960-198  1," paper  prepared  for the 1984  Latin 
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lagged  exchange  rate  reaches a t-statistic  higher  than  4 when the change 
in the export volume is made the dependent variable, although the 
coefficient  for the contemporaneous  exchange  rate  change  is nil. 
Intercepts  appear  related  to the trend  in the terms  of trade;  those for 
Mexico  and  Venezuela  are  positive, and  all  others  are  negative.  Although 
the results are far from spectacular  and call for more disaggregated 
research,  they confirm  the importance  of expansion  in OECD  countries 
for Latin American  export recovery. While data and methodology  are 
too shaky to forcefully assert specific estimates, table 13 indicates an 
elasticity substantially  greater  than 1 between the purchasing  power of 
exports  and OECD  growth  at least for Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chile.  The 
results  also indicate  a more  transient  but  important  influence  of exchange 
rate policy on exports. The concern remains,  however, that under  the 
conditions  of the early 1980s,  across-the-board  devaluations  could have 
harmful  effects on the terms  of trade;  this suggests  that  optimum  policies 
would combine devaluations  and selective export taxes. Last, there is 
no assurance that the post-1982 recovery in OECD countries will on 
average  raise Latin American  exports as much as previous recoveries 
did. In the countries  under  study, 1983  dollar  merchandise  exports  rose 
weakly  or not at all, but  preliminary  data  for the first  half  of 1984  present 
a more  optimistic  picture. 
THE  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE 
As a relative  price, the real exchange  rate  can be expected to depend 
on other relative prices and real factors. In particular,  the equilibrium 
real exchange rate under Latin American conditions is likely to be 
significantly  influenced  by permanent  and even temporary  changes in 
the external  terms  of trade  (including  the world  real  interest  rate)  and  in 
international  capital  flows; the rate should  also be affected  by changes 
in the level of protection  and, at least temporarily,  by domestic  policies 
of various  sorts. 
Earlier  experiments gave encouraging  results on the link between 
terms of trade, regarded as exogenously given to  Latin American 
economies, and the observed real exchange rate.28  Table 14 continues 
28. Carlos  F. Diaz-Alejandro,  "Some Historical  Vicissitudes  of Open  Economies  in 
Latin  America," in Richard  N. Cooper and others, eds., The  International  Monetary 
System Under  Flexible Exchange Rates-Global,  Regional, and National: Essays in 
Honor  of Robert Triffin  (Ballinger,  1982),  especially  table 11-6,  p. 180.  A more detailed 374  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
Table  14. Regressions  for Real Exchange  Ratesa 
Independent 
variable  Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Mexico  Venezuela 
Intercept  4.83  6.05  11.54  7.28  9.97  4.21 
(1.89)  (5.47)  (2.66)  (4.85)  (10.50)  (7.84) 
In of terms  - 0.36  -0.30  -0.76  -0.56  -0.43  -0.03 
of trade  (-0.81)  (-1.95)  (-2.37)  (-3.22)  (-3.68)  (-0.42) 
In of imports 
over exports,  0.25  - 0.05  -0.92  -0.13  -0.64  0.12 
lagged  (0.76)  (-0.26)  (-1.17)  (-0.54)  (-4.87)  (1.04) 
Maxi dummy  0.28  0.15  0.18  0.09  0.23  0.18 
(3.75)  (3.24)  (1.45)  (1.73)  (6.19)  (2.98) 
Maxi dummy,  0.17  0.09  0.23  0.06  0.20  0.08 
lagged  (2.20)  (1.74)  (2.13)  (1.12)  (5.51)  (1.35) 
Trend  ...  ...  ...  0.025  ...  ... 
(5.34) 
Summary  statistic 
Rj2  0.39  0.54  0.37  0.63  0.79  0.36 
Autoregressive 
parameter  -0.65  -0.54  -0.65  -0.57  -0.50  -0.74 
Degrees 
of freedom  27  17  17  25  17  17 
Source: Real  dollar  exchange  rates, as in table 1. Data  on terms  of trade,  U.N. Economic  Commission  for Latin 
America.  Import and export  data,  IMF,  International  Finiancial Statistics,  Yearbook 1983. Independent  variables, 
see text. 
a. Dependent  variable  is the natural  log of the real  exchange  rate.  Annual  data.  Maxi  dummies  took values  of 1.0 
as follows: Argentina:  1956, 1959, 1962, 1972, 1975, 1981, and 1982. Brazil: 1964, 1979, 1980, 1983. Chile: 1963, 1973, 
1974, 1982, 1983. Colombia:  1957, 1958, 1963, 1966. Mexico:  1976, 1977, 1982. Venezuela:  1964. 
some of these experiments  and  gives the "best" results  for each country 
by using data for each country as far back as they seemed reliable. 
Examination  of the data on terms of trade showed a close, positive 
correlation  between those for a given year and those for the previous 
year; the R2 ranged  from  0.4 to 0.9. The terms  of trade  variable  used in 
table 14  is therefore  the logarithm  of the simple  average  for the contem- 
poraneous  and the lagged (by one year) terms of trade. As a proxy for 
capital  flows, which are assumed  to be supply-constrained,  the average 
study  for Argentina  is found  in Carlos  F. Diaz-Alejandro,  "Exchange  Rates  and  Terms  of 
Trade  in the Argentine  Republic,  1913-1976,"  in Moshe Syrquin  and Sim6n  Teitel, eds., 
Trade,  Stability, Technology  and Equity  in Latin America  (Academic  Press, 1982),  pp. 
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ratio of merchandise imports over exports for years t -  1, t -  2, and 
t -  3  was included  as another  independent  variable.  Clearly,  this  variable 
could also be picking  up reserve losses (signaling  not appreciation  but 
impending  devaluation)  as well as growth  differentials  between  the home 
country  and  the rest of the world. Measurement  difficulties  impeded  the 
inclusion  of commercial  policy variables  as a third  real influence  on the 
real  exchange  rate. 
Can policy actions, especially via large and presumably  unexpected 
nominal  devaluations,  affect the real exchange  rate?  Many  thought  not 
during  the late 1970s  in Latin America's Southern  Cone countries. To 
test the proposition, I concocted for each country "maxi dummies" 
having a value of 1 when large nominal  devaluations  occurred and 0 
otherwise. "Large" devaluations  were defined  relative  to previous  and 
following years and relative to average nominal  devaluations  for each 
country. When devaluations  occurred very late in a given year, they 
were assigned to the following year. Maxi dummies were concocted 
after obtaining  mixed results with other nominal  policy variables  such 
as the acceleration  of monetary  expansion.29 
The  regressions  estimated  in  table 14  combine  real  and  policy  variables 
in an admittedly  ad hoc fashion and without  exploring  their  interaction; 
these facts plus the use of annual  data limit claims that the regressions 
would  predict  the true  equilibrium  real  exchange  rates  for each country. 
Nevertheless, a number of conclusions may be drawn from them. 
Excepting  Argentina  and Venezuela, terms of trade show a significant 
influence on the real exchange rate. In Venezuela during  the period 
under  study, very ample  exchange  reserves  weakened  the expected link 
between  those two variables,  while  in Argentina  that  link  may  have been 
swamped by volatility in other real and policy variables. Only the 
regression  for Mexico shows a significant  coefficient  for the capital  flow 
proxy  variable. 
The maxi dummies, on the other hand, do remarkably  well, often 
stealing significance  from the other variables. Interestingly,  the maxi 
dummies  do poorly in Colombia,  where a badly managed  maxi deval- 
uation  in 1962-63  paved the way for the adoption  in 1967  of a crawling 
peg; since then Colombia  has avoided maxi devaluations.  (Colombia  is 
29. An interesting  attempt  to model  abrupt  exchange  rate  adjustments  can be found  in 
David  E. Yuravlivker,  "Political  Shocks, International  Reserves  and  the Real Exchange 
Rate,  Argentina,  1970s"  (Washington,  D.C.: World  Bank, 1984). 376  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
also the only country whose real exchange rate shows a positive trend 
stretching  back to the 1950s.) On the whole the dummies  leave little 
doubt that maxi nominal  devaluations  can increase the real exchange 
rate contemporaneously  and with a one-year lag. Taken literally, the 
regressions  of table 14 indicate  that the maxis can engineer  permanent 
changes  in the real  exchange  rate  (that  is, no negative  lagged  coefficients 
were obtained). 
The poor results obtained  with the proxy variable  for capital  flow led 
to further  experimentation  by using the U.S. real interest  rate ex post; 
the expectation was that the higher  that rate, the more depreciated  the 
Latin  American  exchange  rates  would  be. Only  the  regressions  for Brazil 
and,  again,  Mexico yielded  interesting  results  (not  shown).  The  Brazilian 
results are not robust with respect to different specifications. The 
Mexican  results, on the other  hand, are  remarkably  good. 
Table  14  combined  with  tables 11, 12,  and 13  suggests  that  the  dynamic 
interactions  among  terms of trade, exchange  rates, and trade  flows can 
become quite  complex  even when  taking  the  terms  of trade  as exogenous. 
Terms of trade and capital flows will influence  the real exchange rate, 
which in turn  will affect imports  and exports. Lags in these interactions 
could confuse the policymaker  who does not have a reasonable  estimate 
of "permanent"  terms of trade  and capital  flows and of their  structural 
links with the  "equilibrium"  real exchange rate. Without such an 
estimate  it is impossible  to evaluate  whether  a maxi  devaluation  is needed 
to bring  the real  exchange  rate  to its equilibrium  level. Table 14  provides 
far  from  all of the necessary  guidelines,  but together  with the small 1983 
error  terms  in its regressions,  not shown, it has qualitative  implications: 
it indicates that if 1983  terms of trade  and capital  flows are assumed  to 
be permanent,  then the 1983  real  exchange  rates  were about  right,  in the 
sense of being compatible  with the hypothesis  underlying  table 14. The 
debatable  exceptions to this may be Colombia  and Venezuela. During 
the first half of 1984 the Venezuelan real exchange rate depreciated 
significantly;  Colombia  accelerated  her mini devaluations,  also raising 
her real  exchange  rate. 
Some Reflections on the Land of Oz and a Look at the Future 
In this final  section I first  explore more  fully the issue of capital  flight 
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that many a Latin American president must have faced in deciding 
whether  to service the external  debt and the related  issue of whether  to 
sign a standby  agreement  with the IMF. Whatever  was expected by the 
countries  undergoing  adjustment,  I show that  the rewards  offered  by the 
international  system to these countries thus far have been meager. I 
close with some modest proposals  for international  action.30 
PUBLIC  DEBT,  PRIVATE  ASSETS 
Faced  with  unusual  economic  and  political  uncertainties,  Latin  Amer- 
ican middle and upper classes have traditionally  diversified  their port- 
folios, placing some of their wealth in Miami, New York, London, 
Zurich, and even Montevideo and Panama.  Frequently  in such cases 
money has been deposited in the same  foreign  banks  that are lending  to 
home country firms and governments. Such "exportation  of financial 
intermediation"  has been common  particularly  in Central  America  and 
the Caribbean  at least since the beginning  of this century. Internation- 
alized households would also prefer  to buy government  bonds, denom- 
inated  in foreign  currency,  in London  or New York  rather  than  locally. 
Historically  the net portfolio share held abroad,  perhaps  one-tenth, 
has been considered  compatible  with a socioeconomic system of toler- 
able legitimacy; the share held abroad appears to have risen sharply 
since around 1981, especially in Argentina,  Chile, Mexico, and Vene- 
zuela. For some groups it may have gone above 100 percent; when 
subsets  of households  are consolidated  with  firms  they have owned, one 
may find liabilities  at home and assets abroad.  The following  domestic 
policies  all  combined  to generate  enormous  incentives  to place  household 
wealth  abroad:  overvalued  exchange  rates  that  could  not be expected to 
last, government  subsidization  of external  borrowing,  cheap  public  loans 
to domestic firms, company laws with lax equity requirements  and 
clumsy  bankruptcy  provisions,  and  unrestricted  convertibility.  Eager  to 
buttress overvalued exchange rates, some governments guaranteed 
future  access to cheap foreign exchange to firms  borrowing  abroad,  or 
themselves borrowed  abroad  to relieve pressure  on reserves. Even as 
some entrepreneurs  borrowed heavily for their firms, either in local 
currency  or in dollars with central  bank promises of cheap dollars  for 
repayment,  they quietly placed their private  household  wealth abroad. 
30. Such  a discussion  can be found  in Diaz-Alejandro,  "Good-Bye  Financial  Repres- 
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One may conjecture  that such behavior  would  not be tolerated  in Korea 
and  Taiwan. 
As was seen earlier,  when  the crisis  came  with  sharp  real  devaluations 
and the cessation of external lending, governments faced a classic 
dilemma.  Textbook  rules of the game  would have indicated  bankruptcy 
proceedings  for firms  unable  to service  debts;  presumably  new domestic 
and foreign entrepreneurs  would have put existing physical assets to 
work under new management.  Domestic financial  intermediaries  that 
had lent to bankrupt  firms  or had guaranteed  their external  borrowings 
might  also have to undergo  bankruptcy  proceedings;  the domestic  lender 
of last  resort  would  have  to guard  against  a generalized  panic  and  perhaps 
also against  a wholesale takeover  of domestic  banks  by foreign  ones, as 
happened  in Cuba  during  the 1920-21  crisis. 
The textbook solution never had a chance; that this was known ex 
ante by major  actors is the reason that domestic firms  relied  heavily on 
debt and that entrepreneurs  placed as little as possible of their own 
money into firms.  Arguing  the need to save the private  sector, maintain 
employment,  and avoid the wholesale takeover  by multinational  banks 
and corporations  of the country's assets, governments  stepped in. In 
some cases the rhetoric of intervention  had a radical cast, as in the 
Mexican 1982  "nationalization"  of the banking  system; in others, as in 
the Chilean  "interventions"  of early 1983,  the  rhetoric  was paradoxically 
laissez faire. The substance  of intervention  was quite  similar  even as the 
rhetoric  and instruments  varied. By 1984  most of the private external 
debt had been socialized (as in Chile), or its  servicing was being 
subsidized via special exchange rates, repayment schedules, or tax 
concessions (as in almost all countries). Much of the domestic private 
debt had also been socialized or liquified  by inflation  accompanied  by 
controls, as in Argentina.3" 
The private  assets abroad,  however, have remained  strictly  private. 
Public  debt is public  in that it is both the responsibility  of the state and 
highly publicized. Private assets belong mostly to households and are 
31. The remarkable  Chilean  case has been analyzed  in detail  in Jose Pablo  Arellano, 
"De la liberalizaci6n  a la intervenci6n:  El Mercado  de Capitales  en Chile 1974-83," 
Colecci6n  Estudios CIEPLAN  11 (Santiago,  Chile:  CIEPLAN, 1983),  and in Arellano, 
"La  dificil  salida  al Problema  del Endeudamiento  Interno,  " Colecci6n  Estudios  CIEPLAN 
13 (1984). The Argentine case is discussed by Roberto Frenkel, "Notas para una 
investigaci6n  sobre el sistema  financiero  en Argentina"  (Buenos  Aires: CEDES, 1984), 
and by Roque B. Fernandez,  "La Crisis  Financiera  Argentina:  1980-1982,"  Desarrollo 
Econ6mico  (Buenos  Aires), vol. 23 (April-June  1983),  pp. 79-97. Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro  379 
surrounded  by secrecy; the income they generate  is frequently  exempt 
from taxes. This situation  reduces the political  legitimacy  of efforts to 
service the external  debt; indeed, it has generated  a crisis of legitimacy 
for the role of the private  sector in Latin  American  development. 
The international  system as it stands circa 1984  has encouraged  the 
erosion  of legitimacy  of a mixed  economic system in Latin  America,  and 
not  just by offering  extravagant  real  interest  rates, safety, and  numerous 
tax havens. Pressures  were brought  upon countries  to socialize private 
external  debt  ex post and  to support  private  local  firms  with  debts  abroad. 
External debts of all sorts have increasingly been brought into the 
definition  of the debt  of nations  with  the presumption  that  all  debt, public 
or private, is the responsibility  of the whole country  and of the current 
government  whether or not that regime  had anything  to do with those 
contracts  and  whether  or not those contracts  were legal. 
An orchestrated  chorus of banks, governments  of OECD countries, 
and international  organizations  is increasingly  publicizing  the debt and 
broadening  its definition  while the secrecy of the liabilities  of corpora- 
tions and financial  intermediaries  in OECD countries  is fiercely main- 
tained.  (There  are  exceptions:  the U. S. government  succeeded  in  breach- 
ing  the secrecy of Cayman  Islands  banks  while  pursuing  an investigation 
of drug  traffic.  The British  were annoyed.)  Foreign  banks  will not report 
to Latin American governments even the interest earnings of Latin 
American  residents;  U. S. banks  will not withhold  taxes on interest  when 
depositors  give a non-U.S. address. Both capital  flight  and tax evasion 
by foreigners are openly encouraged  by private and public actors in 
OECD  countries. During  1984  there were reports  that U.S. banks  were 
engaged  in high-powered  campaigns  to sell their certificates  of deposit 
in several Latin  American  countries.  The U. S. Treasury  has announced 
plans to sell securities  to foreign  investors, who will not have to reveal 
their names; new regulations  will also allow U.S. corporations  to sell 
bearer  bonds overseas without resorting  to offshore subsidiaries,  and 
securities concerns hope to sell to overseas investors bearer bonds 
backed  by U.S. Treasury  bonds.32  Behavior  not permitted  to domestic 
citizens is encouraged  among  foreigners. 
Increasingly,  the international  system offers Latin  American  middle 
32. See Alan Murray  and Michael R. Sesit, "Treasury  Issues to Give Secrecy to 
Foreigners,"  Wall  Street  Journal,  August 17, 1984,  p. 3. On the breaching  of the secrecy 
of the  Cayman  Islands'  banks,  see Jo  Thomas,  "Islands'  Bank  Secrecy  Is Lifted  for  U.S.," 
New  York  Times, July 27, 1984, p. A3. 380  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1984 
and  upper  classes comfortable  possibilities  for capital  and  personal  exit, 
decreasing  their  incentives  for expressing  their  voice in local affairs,  and 
eroding  their  loyalty to the state, which nevertheless  is expected by the 
OECD  countries  to collect taxes to service  debt  and  to provide  a suitable 
climate  for investment, trade, and governance.  Purely  national  circuits 
for transferring  savings into investments are undermined:  few local 
entrepreneurs  will undertake significant  investments without public 
guarantees  and the participation  of a foreign "godfather,"  whether a 
transnational  enterprise  or an international  financial  institution.  Domes- 
tic savers will prefer  to bank  and place financial  wealth abroad,  wealth 
which may or may not return  to the home country  via foreign  interme- 
diaries  drawing  on those savings.  Internationalized  citizens  benefit  from 
the high interest on their bank accounts while their less mobile fellow 
residents complain about usury. All this seems like a new stance for 
overcoming  the uncertainties  of underdevelopment  and erratic  govern- 
ments but one which seems vulnerable  to nationalist  fury and to the 
anger  of the majority  without  wealth  abroad.  It appears  that  institutions 
in this Latin  American  setting  become weaker  the more  public  they are: 
internationalized  households do relatively  well and incorporated  firms 
less so, while public sectors, presumably  representing  all households, 
are in a shambles. 
THE  ZIMBABWE  APPROACH,  OR  THE  COSTS  AND  BENEFITS 
OF  ACTIVE  OR  PASSIVE  DEFAULT 
In recent years the new Zimbabwian  government  inherited  a large 
public debt, much of it to South Africa. Zimbabwe  argued  that funds 
taken  out of the country  on private  account  had  found  their  way to South 
Africa and demanded  their return. It noted that Zimbabwe  could not 
only default  on its public  debt  but  could also take  over substantial  South 
African  direct investment  in Zimbabwe.  South Africa  blinked.33  Such a 
negotiation  is remote from Latin American  circumstances,  but it is a 
helpful reminder  of the variety of bargaining  chips involved when a 
government  considers  whether  to default  and,  if so, whether  to do it with 
a repudiation  flourish or passively with a creeping accumulation  of 
arrears. 
33. This  is a crude  summary  and  interpretation  of information  reported  in  the  Financial 
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Consider  the calculations  of a moderate  president  of a hypothetical 
large Latin American debtor. The benefits of maintaining  reasonably 
punctual  interest payments include the hope of fresh funds from the 
private  banking  system, the international  institutions,  and the govern- 
ments of OECD countries and their export promotion  agencies. Local 
businessmen,  particularly  those with extensive international  links, will 
breathe  easier  and  may  invest more  at home  and  less abroad.  Unimpeded 
access to the markets, direct investments, and technology of OECD 
members  are other  pluses. (Note that  even Cuba  has maintained  interest 
payments  to banks in non-U.S. OECD  countries.  It has rescheduled  its 
debt to those banks and those countries, interestingly  without being 
pressed to reach agreement with the IMF, to which Cuba does not 
belong.) The costs of continued  debt service include squeezing  growth 
to generate the necessary trade surpluses, which cuts real absorption 
and  wages. Employment  may suffer  even as real  wages are cut. 
The benefits of default, besides the suspension  of interest  payments 
abroad,  could include  the seizure  of direct  foreign  investment  within  the 
country. Payment of principal could be postponed indefinitely, and 
tiresome rescheduling  sessions could be avoided. The costs of default 
(which for smaller countries could be very high) include the possible 
denial by OECD member  countries of their markets,  technology, and 
portfolio  and direct investment. In the short run the loss of short-term 
trade  credits would be especially painful.  It could be that not all OECD 
countries  would impose such embargoes  (note again  the Cuban  case), 
so the calculation  must  include  probabilities  regarding  OECD  solidarity. 
To a moderate leader the political consequences of default present a 
mixed  picture. For a while, the leader  may  bask in nationalist  glory, but 
the forces unleashed  by default, especially an active one, may threaten 
constitutional  order and could reopen the gates to populist-nationalist 
authoritarian  generals-after  all, the nation would be surrounded  by 
enemies. 
Many  intermediate  solutions  are  possible, and  the moderate  president 
may  hope  to bargain  for  a better  deal  without  open  default.  The  president 
knows that although  neither  open nor creeping  default  is likely to bring 
financial  disaster  to OECD  countries,  either  type of default  would  place 
OECD  governments  in the politically  uncomfortable  position  of having 
to rescue  two, three, or more  major  banks.  OECD  monetary  targets  may 
have  to be busted  during  the rescue. The  president  knows  that  bargainers 382  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
from OECD countries  are aware  that the president  knows all this. The 
bargaining  situation  will also be influenced  by the possibility  that, while 
no major  debtor  country wants to be the first to break  openly with the 
international  creditors, once the ice is broken  others may  join. On the 
other  hand,  a "Malvinas  syndrome"  may  reduce  the urge  to make  a bold 
move leading  to lonely disaster. 
The decision whether to sign a standby agreement with the IMF 
involves considerations similar to  those  surrounding  default. Only 
countries  with  plentiful  reserves  or socialist  revolutions  or  without  much 
need  for  fresh, net loans  will  indulge  in the political  luxury  of maintaining 
punctual debt servicing, adopting stiff stabilization  plans, and doing 
without the formal blessing of the IMF. Much of the home business 
sector, even with punctual servicing of the external debt, may feel 
vulnerable  without the reassurance  that the IMF is supervising  their 
country's financial  leaders. Political leaders, on the other hand, may 
hope that  once the crisis is over and  international  reserves  rise, they will 
be able to use "creative accounting"  to nibble away at the agreement 
with the IMF. 
A last, delicate consideration  will influence  the bargaining  climate  as 
well as the eagerness  of Latin  American  governments  to tax earnings  of 
Latin American  private  wealth held abroad.  (No Latin American  gov- 
ernment,  as far  as I know, has pressed  tax authorities  in OECD  countries 
for the relevant  information.)  Unlike in Zimbabwe,  many  people in the 
moderate  regime (or their aunts and cousins) will hold private assets 
abroad  or enjoy substantial  contacts with OECD  actors. The prospects 
of being cut off from their bankers  abroad,  or even from Disneyland, 
will make  many  members  of the elite pause  before  risking  near  anarchy. 
Imagine  the turmoil  if the OECD countries  threatened  to publicize  the 
names of Latin  American  citizens holding  more than $100,000  worth  of 
bank  deposits, real estate, and  other  wealth  within  OECD  nations. 
The default question during  the 1980s  is quite different  from that of 
the 1930s. Rather  than facing scattered  bondholders,  Latin American 
countries  face a handful  of banks  that  not  only  lend  long  but  also dispense 
short-term  trade  credit and hold a good share  of the countries'  interna- 
tional  reserves. Rather  than  facing  a depressed,  divided,  and  demoralized 
North, with its own financial  system in crisis, Latin America faces a 
euphoric  United  States. Rather  than  facing  lame-duck  Hoover  and  good- 
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SYSTEMIC  REWARDS  TO  ADJUSTMENT:  A  CLOSER  LOOK 
An observer from Mars would have been puzzled by the system's 
1982-83 record of rewards  for "good behavior" with respect to debt 
service. As noted earlier,  the flows of fresh money were exiguous, and 
no consoling  initiatives  were  forthcoming  in  trade,  technology,  or  related 
areas. The OECD countries appeared  to take the position that austere 
adjustment  was its own reward or that fear of retaliation  should be 
enough  to maintain  the punctual  observance  of contracts  made  obsolete 
by changes  in the international  economy. 
Until the rescheduling  of Mexican debt in August 1984,  the interna- 
tional  credit  consortium  had  few carrots  to dispense  to the well behaved. 
A careful  study  of the 1982-83  terms  granted  in the first  series  of external 
debt  reschedulings  for nine  Latin  American  countries  found  two features 
of note,:  one is the similarity  of the terms  agreed  upon with the various 
borrowers,  and the second is the deterioration  of the terms  of indebted- 
ness. The negotiated cost of the 1982-83 credits, taking into account 
spreads,  commissions, and amortization  periods, represented  for Mex- 
ico an increase  of more  than 180  percent  over the terms  prevailing  during 
1980-81.34 
During  this process, the hapless IMF has been a bit like the Wizard 
of Oz: a mythologized  contraption  through  which weak human  beings 
speak. Resources available  to the IMF have paled  relative  to the crisis. 
Also, probably  too much  has been made  of IMF  policies and  procedures 
during  the last few years: like the Federal Reserve Board, the IMF 
follows election results, and it could have been singing  a different  tune 
had  Jimmy  Carter  been reelected. Indeed, during  1979-80  the IMF  gave 
every indication of adapting  to a Carter-Callaghan  view of economic 
policy.35  Even if the IMF became  convinced  of the need for stretching 
out adjustment  in Latin  American  countries,  it is doubtful  that with the 
resources  at its disposal  it could do anything  without  a change  of attitude 
in the U.S. administration  and Congress.  Other  multilateral  institutions 
such as the World  Bank and the Inter-American  Bank have also been 
34. See U.N.  Economic Commission  for Latin America,  Adjustment  Policies, pp. 
60-63. 
35. To recapture  the pre-November  1980 mood, now so distant, see "Is the IMF 
Growing  a Softer Heart, or Just a Softer Head?" Economist  (October  4-8,  1980),  pp. 
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under  pressure  from  the U.S. Treasury  (and  the U.S. Republican  party 
platform)  since 1980,  and their capacity  for autonomous  action is very 
limited. International  private banks cannot do much on their own, 
needing  the approval  not  only of their  supervisors  but  also of legislatures. 
A serious flaw in the 1982-83 structure  of systemic incentives to 
adjustment  and debt servicing  was the uncertain  link  between domestic 
austerity  and foreign exchange payoff. A government,  in spite of dra- 
conian measures, could fail to meet its foreign  exchange targets  owing 
to a sudden increase in interest rates abroad,  an unexpected  fall in the 
international  price of its exports, or a tantrum  by a regional  U.S. bank 
or U. S. populist  leader.  Politicians  and  technocrats  putting  their  political 
lives on the line to support  austere adjustment  could be wiped out by 
exogenous events which no one understands  and whose rationality  is 
moot. The lack of safety nets that would deal with such events and 
reassure  bold adjusters  is curious  from the international  system's own 
viewpoint. 
The Mexican rescheduling  of August 1984  may open new vistas that 
are not yet visible. Perhaps  there are additional  secret reassurances  to 
the well behaved that are not publicly revealed for political or moral- 
hazard reasons; perhaps there are secret plans to be enacted after 
November  1984  to stretch  out  repayment  schedules  and  to reduce  interest 
and  fees for many  countries.  As to growth,  if a credible  promise  cannot 
be made to support economic expansion among the debtors, at least 
insurance  against  a worsening  situation  could be provided. 
A  REVIEW  OF  SCENARIOS 
Forecasting  the balance of payments  for Latin American  countries 
has become a major indoor sport among bankers, bureaucrats,  and 
academics. Yet even among  those most outspoken  about the excesses 
of Latin American  inflation,  public expenditures,  and budget deficits, 
little or no attention  is paid  to the connection  between  foreign  exchange 
supplies  and these excesses; when it comes to deciding  whether  or not 
interest payments will be forthcoming, attention will focus  almost 
exclusively on the balance of payments. References to inflation  and 
budget  deficits  are  typically  left to final,  exhortative  paragraphs.  It seems 
as if the IMF  targets  or objectives  in the fiscal  and  macroeconomic  areas 
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foreign  exchange  availabilities  than  as overambitious  goals to make  sure 
that,  if policy errors  are to be made, they will be made  on the side of too 
much  rather  than too little restrictiveness. Overkill  in macroeconomic 
policy fattens the trade surplus. This could explain why the 1983-84 
stabilization  plans adopted under IMF sponsorship  have been so suc- 
cessful in meeting  trade  surplus  objectives  while overshooting  their  own 
inflation  projections and undershooting  their growth projections. The 
inflation  and  growth  estimates  were known  at the outset  to be unrealistic. 
It is often argued  that the important  thing is not whether  forecasts of 
inflation  or growth  are met but to have an IMF standby  agreement  and 
"process," meaning that what counts is the trade surplus. The new 
Argentine  government,  coming  to power  after  many  years  of official  lies, 
had trouble accepting such misleading  stabilization  programs,  and ap- 
parently  this was one of the stumbling  blocks in their negotiations  with 
the IMF. The Brazilian  military  regime,  on the other  hand,  seems almost 
to have relished  signing  unrealistic  letters  of intent;  since  December  1982 
it has signed  four of them. 
There are few mysteries in the mechanics of balance of payments 
forecasts  available  for  major  Latin  American  countries.  The  same  crucial 
variables  and coefficients can be found in all of them:  growth  in OECD 
countries  and the induced growth of Latin American  exports, the real 
international  interest  rate, net new "involuntary"  or "concerted"  lend- 
ing  by private  banks, and  direct  foreign  investment.  Real  exchange  rates 
and what they can do to push exports further  are usually the major 
domestic  policy variable  taken  into account. Policy-induced  declines in 
oil imports are sometimes featured. Non-oil imports and the growth 
allowed by them are the residuals. Most forecasters seem to regard 
projections  of unemployment36  and real wages to be in bad taste, and 
even fewer dare to provide their best estimates of inflation  and budget 
deficits. 
The  thrust  of these projections  is easily summarized.  Plausible  growth 
in OECD  countries  (without  new protectionism)  combined  with interest 
rate declines, some fresh lending, and domestic export promotion  will 
36. In countries  like Brazil  and Mexico, birth  rates are declining.  But growth  in the 
potential  labor  force still reflects  birth  rates of twenty years ago. According  to the U.N. 
Economic  Commission  for Latin America,  the growth  in Brazilian  population  was 3.0 
percent  per year during  1960-65 and is expected to be 2.2 percent  during  1980-85. For 
Mexico,  the corresponding  figures  are 3.4 and  2.7. 386  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
sharply  reduce ratios of debt to exports and improve  creditworthiness 
almost  everywhere  in  a couple  of years  or  so. Underthese  circumstances, 
Latin  American  growth  could  pick up slowly, and  by 1990  the per capita 
incomes achieved in 1980 could be reached again. Interestingly,  few 
forecasters  dare to paint scenarios more optimistic  than this for Latin 
American  GDP. Few projections  imply  that  net new lending  will exceed 
interest payments during  the next three or four years. Some hope for 
favorable  random  shocks-such  as frosts and  citrus  canker  in Florida  or 
oil discoveries-is  sometimes  offered. 
There are problems with "optimistic" projections contemplating 
Latin American  trade surpluses  for the foreseeable  future,  particularly 
when those surpluses approach  or exceed interest payments.37  Their 
political sustainability  is doubtful  in capital-hungry  countries  expected 
to generate  a persistent  resource  transfer  abroad.  Moreover,  in a context 
of reasonably  free financial  markets,  such projections  are in the nature 
of self-destroying  prophecies, at least on the supply  side. For example, 
if all bankers  were really to believe that Brazil  will be generating  trade 
surpluses  of $15 billion  by the end of the decade, a veritable  stampede 
toward  Brasflia  would occur. Brazilians  would again  be swamped  with 
loan offers and, if Brazilians  accepted the loans, those trade surpluses 
would  not materialize.  Trade  surpluses  of$15 billion  in Brazil  by the end 
of the decade would  require  not only remarkable  political  developments 
within  that  country  but  a permanent  international  credit  consortium  that 
would switch from promoting  to curtailing  international  lending. Per- 
sistently  high  real  interest  rates would  reduce  the demand  for new loans 
but  would  also reduce  the willingness  to squeeze absorption  for the sake 
of generating  trade  surpluses. 
The optimistic scenarios do reflect the fact that substantial  external 
adjustment  has occurred, particularly  in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and 
Venezuela, and that expected balance  of payments  conditions  in those 
countries  provide some room to grow or to substantially  improve  debt 
indicators.  In Argentina,  Brazil, and Mexico inflation  loomed as more 
of an immediate  problem  for 1984  than  external  debt and the balance  of 
37. For one such projection  for Brazil  see Morgan  Guaranty  Trust  Company,  World 
Financial Markets (July 1984). This study concludes that "even on a conservative 
assessment it seems realistic  to envisage Brazil's trade surplus  edging  higher  from the 
present  level of $10-$12 billion  to perhaps  $15  billion  by the end  of the decade.  This  would 
shrink  the current  account deficit  to about $3 billion  per annum  on average, and quite 
possibly  less at least in some years" (p. 11). Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro  387 
payments. Indeed, the improvement  in the payments  situation  and the 
increase in international  reserves in well-behaved  Brazil and Mexico 
hint  at a tougher  negotiating  stance  by these countries  in the near  future. 
The buildup of  Brazilian and Mexican reserves has not produced 
unrestrained  glee among  all lenders. 
The optimistic  scenario could be upset by international  recession in 
1985-86, real interest rates remaining  at 1982-83  levels, an upsurge  of 
foreign  protectionism, or negative or even zero net real lending. Few 
forecasters go much beyond the gloomy foreign exchange earnings 
implied  by those circumstances.  Increases  in nominal  interest  rates and 
further  declines in the prices of some primary  products  during  the first 
semester  of 1984  underlined  how brittle  the debt situation  remains  even 
after  more  than  one year of unexpectedly  vigorous  U.S. recovery. 
There  is little doubt  that the last few years have witnessed a brilliant 
political victory for the Reagan-Thatcher  camp. In the North-South 
arena  they have, thus  far,  disciplined  the third  world  and  even put  OPEC 
on the defensive while reshaping  the multilateral  agencies after their 
own image. Given their agenda  and welfare  function,  they have scored 
well; the fulfillment  of the optimistic scenarios would crown this con- 
servative restoration.  Under these circumstances,  advice on systemic 
reform  based on a different  welfare  function  is unlikely  to get very far. 
Yet even those in charge of the system in 1984 should be concerned 
about  its vulnerability  to bad news and threats  to it from  those who feel 
grievously  wronged. 
Prudent  insurance  steps would start  with the assumption  that events 
of the early 1980s  led to capital  losses to those who engaged  in borrowing 
and  lending  during  the late 1970s  while  expecting  a different  set of events. 
Both  Latin  American  borrowers  and  their  lenders  made  mistakes  in their 
forecasts. There  is a need to share  that  loss in a way that  is perceived  as 
equitable;  also for the sake of the future  there  is a need to guard  against 
severe bad news, against  which private  markets  provide  no insurance. 
A modest package of systemic reforms  would include the following 
points: 
-Expand  IMF resources (which could be borrowed)  so that at least 
the potential  for sensible stabilization  programs  would  exist. 
-Expand  and  reform  the Compensatory  Financing  Facility  (CFF)  to 
provide partial insurance against unexpected fluctuations  in the pur- 
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financial  charges on the external  debt in the price index for imports  of 
goods and services).38 
-At  the expanded CFF, project the purchasing  power of exports 
taking  into account not only expected international  economic circum- 
stances, but  also each country's  domestic  policies. Export  performance, 
suitably  adjusted  for unexpected  changes  in the world  economy as well 
as for supply shocks, could then become the crucial  element  in "condi- 
tionality" for the CFF, the IMF, and other multilateral  institutions.39 
These  organizations  would  also monitor  protectionism  so as to determine 
when export targets  are not being reached  due to restrictive  actions by 
importing  countries. 
-Through  official OECD intervention encourage longer-term  re- 
structuring  of debt and discourage  monopoly  pricing  and the indiscrim- 
inate  lumping  together  of old public  and  private  debts  in the rescheduling 
process. 
-Take  international  action to eliminate tax havens and limit tax 
evasion on interest  earnings  (information  on earnings  by assets held by 
foreigners  would  be shared  only with  governments  committed  to oppos- 
ing confiscation  of the assets); this international  action could be coordi- 
nated with efforts to combat drug traffic  and other illicit trade. Taxes 
levied on interest earned  by Latin American  deposits in foreign  banks 
could be turned  over to the Inter-American  Development  Bank. 
-Through  the moral suasion of central banks restrain aggressive 
marketing  techniques of private banks promoting  capital flight from 
developing  countries. 
The biggest systemic challenge remains  the phasing  out, or at least 
the true internationalization,  of the international  credit consortium 
started  in 1982  to deal with the debt crisis. Unlike 1974-75, few would 
argue in 1984 that the international  economic order is in no need of 
systemic reform, at least in its financial  sphere. It is remarkable  that 
38. For an elaboration  of the case for expanding  and  reforming  the CFF see Carlos  F. 
Diaz-Alejandro,  "International  Markets  in the 1980s,"  Journal  of International  Affairs, 
vol. 38  (Summer  1984),  pp. 11-20.  The  CFF  currently  projects  the  nominal  value  of exports 
and  has no provision  to cover variations  in interest  charges.  The suggested  reform  would 
thus provide  insurance  against  unexpected  changes  in both contemporaneous  and  inter- 
temporal  terms  of trade. 
39. This is a variation  on a very old idea. See Lester  B. Pearson  and  others,  Partners 
in  Development;  Report  of the  Commission  on  InternationalDevelopment  (Praeger,  1969), 
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even IMF publications  describing  today's international  capital  markets 
use terms such as "herd  effect," "contagion  effects," "overlending," 
and "crisis of confidence," which are hardly compatible with well- 
functioning  competitive  markets.40  So far, there  are  few explicit  visions 
of how a reconstructed  international  financial  market  for developing 
countries  would look. But clearly, in a rational  system Mexico would 
not export capital  to the United States, as in 1983-84, and Colombia- 
still a prime candidate  for a 1984  bridge  loan-would  not be subject  to 
the  pressures  it has received from  international  banks. (A popular  story 
alleges that banks forced to lend to Brazil  and Mexico, but facing self- 
imposed,  arbitrary  lending  ceilings  to Latin  America  as a whole, simply 
cut back lending  to Colombia.) 
It may be well to recall a bit of history. Taking advantage  of the 
weakened Argentine position during  the 1930s, the United Kingdom 
successfully imposed the Roca-Runciman  treaties on that country, 
obtaining  especially  favorable  conditions  for British  trade  and  investors, 
conditions  which even cool U.S. observers  found  outrageous.41  Led by 
able technocrats, Argentine economic policy adjusted; the country 
managed  to maintain  punctual servicing of the national  external debt 
and provide foreign exchange for profit  remittances  abroad.  Argentine 
growth  and industrialization  even managed  to pick up, and by the late 
1930s  all seemed reasonably  well. The nationalist-populist  coup of June 
1943,  however, was able to revive memories  of wounded  national  pride 
with notable domestic political success and with disturbing  conse- 
quences  for the international  system. 
40. Paul  Mentre,  The  Fund, Commercial  Banks,  and Member  Countries,  Occasional 
Paper26  (Washington,  D.C.:  IMF,  April  18,1984).  This  paperalso  suggests  thatcompetition 
leads to overlending  (p. 26) and proposes that "foreign  exchange proceeds should be 
centralized  through  market  transactions  or compulsory  requirements.  There  should  be a 
comprehensive  system of external  debt reporting  by individual  corporations,  banks,  and 
public entities and a system of authorizations  or guidelines  for borrowing,  either by 
approving  individual  transactions  or by setting  ceilings  by categories  of external  debt  for 
each  borrowing  entity" (p. 21). This  is a long  way from  the Robichek  doctrine. 
41. See for example  Virgil  Salera,  Exchange  Control  and the  Argentine  Market  (New 
York:  Columbia  University  Press, 1941),  p. 89. U.S. exporters,  of course, felt the Roca- 
Runciman  treaties  placed  British  exporters  in an unfairly  favorable  position.  Today  U.S. 
exporters  to Latin America, unlike German  exporters  to Poland,  appear  to take scant 
notice  of how debt  servicing  limits  their  Latin  American  market,  probably  confident  of the 
dynamism  of their home market.  The same could be said about  U.S. direct  investors  in 
Latin  America. Comments 
and Discussion 
Paul R. Krugman: Carlos Diaz-Alejandro's  paper is a broad sweep 
across  a complex  landscape  and  is more  concerned  with  providing  insight 
into a variety of issues than with developing  any oversimplified  set of 
conclusions. This makes  the task of a discussant  difficult.  What  I will do 
in these comments  is to impose on Diaz-Alejandro's  paper  a schematic 
structure  which probably  does violence to his intention  but may still be 
useful  for purposes  of discussion. 
One way to view this paper, then, is as an effort to answer three 
questions  regarding  debts of less-developed  countries.  The first  of these 
is, how did we get here?  Was it mismanagement  by the debtor  countries 
or an adverse shift  in their  environment?  Or,  more  generally,  what  is the 
mix between these causes? The second question  is, how are we doing? 
Does the success of the IMF, the debtor countries, and the banks in 
avoiding any outright  rupture  so far represent  real progress toward a 
solution  of the problem,  or are we merely  papering  over an increasingly 
untenable  fundamental  position? Third,  where do we go from here? Is 
the current  strategy  the right  one, with perhaps  a few marginal  modifi- 
cations called for, or do we need a major  rethinking? 
How Did We  Get Here? A major  theme of this paper  is the argument 
that, whatever  the sins of debtor  nations, they pale in comparison  with 
the external  shocks  of 1979-82.  One  interpretation  of the  paper's  unusual 
title would  be to note that  while Dorothy  really  should  have had  her dog 
on a leash, basically  it was the tornado  that  was the problem.  Similarly, 
Brazil  really should have devalued  the real cruzeiro  sooner, but it was 
the combination  of world recession and high world real interest rates 
that  pushed  it into crisis. 
Before I discuss this argument,  let me raise a question that Diaz- 
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Alejandro  does not, namely, so what? Aside from the lessons to be 
learned  from  history,  why does it matter  how we got where  we are?  The 
answer, I think, lies in the issue of moral hazard. The current debt 
strategy involves, de facto, an element of bailout of debtors by their 
creditors, on one hand, and bailout of both debtors and creditors  by 
official agencies, on the other. If the problems of debtor countries 
basically  reflected  irresponsible  behavior,  such a bailout  would  provide 
encouragement  for more such behavior in the future. If, on the other 
hand, the debt crisis can be viewed basically as an act of God (or his 
earthly  manifestation,  Paul  Volcker),  this is not a concern. 
What,  then, is the evidence presented  in this paper  for the dominant 
role of the external shock? It is of three kinds. The paper  argues, first, 
that  the economic management  of at least some of the problem  debtors 
was not that  bad, second, that  the external  shocks  were of overwhelming 
magnitude,  and  third,  the fact that  countries  with  very different  pre-1982 
policies all found themselves in similar  straits  shows the predominance 
of external  factors. 
Judging  the quality  of economic management  directly instead of by 
results  is not an easy task. As far as we can  judge, some countries,  such 
as Argentina,  followed remarkably  unsound  policies in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. Others, such as Brazil, were sober and apparently 
realistic. As the paper says, there was undoubtedly  something  wrong 
with each country's  policy, but an observer  in 1980  would  not have seen 
a Latin  America-wide  pattern  of catastrophically  bad management. 
The second argument-that external shocks were of great impor- 
tance-is  clearly  right.  However, I am unhappy  with  the way the case is 
argued.  In the paper  the sharp  cutback  of new lending  to debtors  in 1982- 
83 is treated as an exogenous event-rather  as if Robert Shiller had 
descended  from  heaven and decreed  lending  to Latin  America  suddenly 
unfashionable.  This is just not a satisfactory  procedure. If a country 
were to follow irresponsible  policies and lose the confidence  of lenders 
as a result, one would not want to treat the falloff of lending as an 
exogenous event. I would prefer  to regard  domestic economic manage- 
ment, the terms of trade, and interest rates as the fundamentals  here, 
and  the supply  of funds as an endogenous  variable.  This still supports  a 
view that assigns heavy weight to the external  factors, but it does so to 
a somewhat  less dramatic  extent than  this paper's  approach. 
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for the dominance of the external shocks. Tough-minded  Brazil and 
Chile fared no better than spendthrift  Mexico and wacko Argentina, 
suggesting  that  the fault  was in their  stars  rather  than  themselves. 
The moral of this analysis, then, is that irresponsible  behavior by 
debtors did not bring on the crisis, so that we need not worry about 
creating  incentives for future  irresponsibility  by attempting  to manage 
the crisis. 
How Are We  Doing? The central  fact about the handling  of the debt 
crisis that we need to evaluate is the remarkable  movement of LDC 
trade balances into large surplus. On the face of it this is good news: 
debtors are showing an ability to adjust their balances of payments, 
which should  be a source of reassurance  to their  creditors.  The question 
is whether  this success is in some sense illusory. Is the favorable  trade 
performance  only borrowed  at the expense of the future, on one hand, 
or being purchased  at an ultimately  unsustainable  social cost, on the 
other? 
The paper suggests both conclusions. It argues that trade balance 
improvements  are largely  being achieved at the expense of investment 
and that this will either cripple  future  growth  or require  a large import 
bulge in the future. It also argues  that the legitimacy  of debtor-country 
institutions  is being  radically  eroded. 
The  argument  that  investment  and  imports  are  near-perfect  substitutes 
is a compellingly  simple one. What  would have been useful here is an 
accounting  exercise, even if it is necessarily speculative:  how much of 
the improvement  in trade balances can we attribute  to the decline in 
investment? 
Now it may be the case that improved  trade  balances  reflect  nothing 
but investment  cuts and  recession in debtor  countries  and  that  the gains 
will rapidly  vanish when these economies expand. Here again I wish 
that  Diaz-Alejandro  had  used his econometrics  to produce  an  accounting 
of sources of trade balance improvement.  My own impression,  based 
partly  on preliminary  work by one of my students, partly  on hunch, is 
that  recession is not the whole story. In Mexico, in particular,  expendi- 
ture switching  via the huge real devaluation  and exchange  controls  has 
probably  played  an important  role even in the events so far  and  will play 
an increasingly  important  role over time. 
Finally, there is the question of the sustainability  of all this. Econo- 
mists  are  nearly  as bad  at making  political  forecasts  as political  scientists 
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tance  of capital  flight  for  the legitimacy  of the debt strategy;  I understand 
that  Jeffrey  Sachs will have something  to say about  that, so I gratefully 
leave it to him. 
Where  Do We Go from Here? The final question is one of policy. 
This  is not a major  theme in the paper,  and  perhaps  could not have been 
given the paper's other aims. A full discussion of the policy response 
requires  a theoretical  basis, and that means a whole other paper. Still, 
we should  say something  about  the theory  and  practice  of debt strategy. 
Over the last few years several authors,  including  William  Cline and 
Jeffrey  Sachs, have developed at least a schematic  theory  of the role of 
policy in a debt crisis. The heart  of this theory is the argument  that in a 
debt crisis, continued  lending is unprofitable  for any individual  lender 
because of the risks of future nonpayment,  but it is in the collective 
interest  of creditors  to lend enough to avert an immediate  default. The 
problem of collective action can be used to justify both involuntary 
lending by existing creditors and official lending to mitigate  the free- 
rider  problem.  In other  words, the theoretical  analysis  suggests  that  the 
current  debt strategy  of creditor  nations  makes  at least some sense. 
Diaz-Alejandro  appears  to agree. His list of proposed  reforms  is more 
a set of marginal  changes than a radical  rethinking.  In fact, I can easily 
think of some other major sensible changes-for  example, telling the 
IMF to worry less about inflation  and budget deficits and to focus its 
plans more  on expenditure  switching  and  less on expenditure  reducing. 
A final  note. I once had occasion to explain  the current  debt strategy 
to a largely  agribusiness  audience  in Minnesota.  When  I had finished,  I 
was informed  that what I had described  was basically  the same as what 
a local bank does with a farmer  in trouble.  I'm an Easterner,  to whom 
the whole Midwest is one big blur, so perhaps I can be forgiven for 
assuming  that  other  states  are  just like Minnesota  in this  regard-in other 
words, for suggesting  that we may still be in Kansas  after  all. 
Jeffrey D. Sachs: When Carlos Diaz-Alejandro  chose in his title and 
analogies  to place the current  international  debt  crisis  in the Land  of Oz, 
he selected an appropriate  venue. Few people realize that the original 
Wizard  of Oz by L. Frank  Baum  is itself partly  an economic parable  in 
which  the Wicked  Witch  of the East represents  Eastern  capitalists  who 
dehumanize  kindly laborers like the Tin Woodman.'  The word Oz is 
1. See H. M. Littlefield, "The Wizard  of Oz: Parable  on Populism," American 
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probably  constructed  by one-letter  transpositions  of NY, the home of 
those predatory  capitalists. Baum, a bemused populist sympathizer  at 
the turn  of the century, would  delight  in Diaz-Alejandro's  characteriza- 
tion of the "hapless" IMF as today's Wizard. 
What is harder  to judge from the paper is whether Diaz-Alejandro 
shares  the original  story's  populist  sentiments.  At  places, he does suggest 
that  external  shocks from  the OECD  played  the predominant  role in the 
debt crisis. In his context, he blames  the Wicked  Witch  of the North  for 
the economic suffering  of the South. In many  other  places, however, he 
recognizes  that severe self-inflicted  wounds  have played  a major  role in 
the process. In the end, we don't know whether  it's the IMF that needs 
a heart  or the Southern  Cone dictatorships  that  need a brain. 
The great strength and charm of this paper is indeed its eclectic 
approach.  We sense that Diaz-Alejandro  is unwilling  to be swept into 
simplistic  arguments  about  the  causes  of the  debt  crisis,  and  by extension, 
its resolution.  We  are  titillated  with  awide  range  of ideas  and  observations 
that place the source of the crisis primarily  in external  shocks but also 
in widespread  capital  flight,  poor exchange  rate  management,  and  so on. 
On  the issue of resolving  the debt  crisis, Diaz-Alejandro  is again  eclectic 
and  reserved:  better  exchange  rate  management  in the debtor  countries, 
moderate  IMF  policies, fast OECD  growth,  and  modest  systemic  reform 
all play a role in Diaz-Alejandro's  desired  process. 
Unfortunately,  this eclectic approach  does not provide  a convincing 
answer  to the question  that  Diaz-Alejandro  raises eloquently.  How is it 
that  in a group  of countries  that  pursued  vastly different  policies, a group 
that  includes  both oil importers  and  exporters  as well as current  account 
deficit  and surplus  countries  (Venezuela),  each country  ended  up in the 
same contractionary,  debt-ridden  condition  in 1984?  And conversely, 
how is it that many countries  outside of Latin America,  faced with the 
same shocks and loaded with a heavy external burden, have (so far) 
avoided  the crisis? 
In the second section of the paper, Diaz-Alejandro  stresses a two- 
stage explanation  of the debt crisis, focusing  heavily  on external  shocks 
to the debtor  countries.  In the first  stage (1980-81),  the Latin  American 
economies were battered  by terms of trade  deterioration  as a result of 
higher  OPEC  prices and a deep recession in the OECD. The reduction 
in export  earnings  ushered  in the second stage  (1982-present),  when the 
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lending. Diaz-Alejandro  regards  this credit cutoff as prompted  by, but 
not  justified  by, the worsening  terms of trade. In his view, the terms  of 
trade  deterioration  should  have led to a gradual  reduction  in lending  but 
not the stampede away from new loans that occurred in 1982. His 
emphasis  on the suddenness  and  "collective irrationality"  of the lending 
cutoff is convincing. Recent theorizing has shown how such "herd 
behavior"  can result  from  the rational  decisions of individual  banks.2 
The main problem  with Diaz-Alejandro's  two-stage argument  is its 
overemphasis  on external  shocks  and  underemphasis  on domestic  policy 
mistakes  in explaining  the Latin American  predicament.  On one hand, 
Mexico and Venezuela had huge terms of trade improvements  after 
1979;  and on the other, the developing  countries  in Asia also suffered 
terms of trade declines of the magnitude  in Latin America without 
provoking  a dire crisis. A comparison  is made  in my table 1, to which I 
return  several times. The cutoff in lending  to Mexico and  others  in 1982 
did  not result  simply  from  external  shocks or from  a bankers'  panic.  The 
cutoff arose as much from a remarkable  hemorrhaging  of dollars  from 
these economies, in the form  of capital  flight,  after 1980.  Foreign  official 
borrowing  by the Latin  American  economies supported  perhaps  $50-60 
billion  of capital  flight  in 1981-82  alone. 
A short  digression  on the Venezuelan  case can make the point most 
clearly.  3 From 1974  to 1982,  Venezuela  ran  a cumulative  current  account 
surplus  of $5 billion. It enjoyed two huge terms of trade gains in the 
decade during  the oil shocks of 1973-74  and 1979-80. By 1981, it had 
accumulated  foreign  reserves of $19  billion. And yet by 1983,  real GNP 
was falling  by 4.7 percent  and the government  is now renegotiating  $22 
billion  of external  public  debt. 
What  happened  in this case, I believe, highlights  what  is true  for  much 
2. The main point of this theorizing  is that each bank's loan decision is properly 
affected  by the loan decisions of other  banks. Since no bank  alone can extend all of the 
credit  that Mexico or Brazil  needs to stay afloat,  it is prudent  for each bank  to lend new 
money  only if other  banks  are making  new loans  as well. Because  of this interdependence 
of the banks' decisions, aggregate  bank lending may stop not because the country's 
position  has changed,  but  because  each  individual  bank  believes  that  all of the other  banks 
have  decided  to stop  lending.  The  prophecy  of a loan  cutoff  can  then  become  self-fulfilling. 
For  details,  see Richard  N. Cooper  and  Jeffrey  Sachs, "Foreign  Borrowing:  The Debtor's 
Perspective,  " Working  Paper  1427  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  August  1984). 
3. For a clear exposition  of the Venezuelan  experience,  see Miguel  Rodriguez,  "La 
verdad  sobre  el endeudamiento  externo  venezolano"  (Instituto  de Estudios  Superiores  de 
Administraci6n,  Caracas,  1984). 396  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1984 
of the hemisphere.  During 1980-83 the Venezuelan  private sector fled 
the domestic financial  system and placed perhaps  $20 billion  of foreign 
assets in the rest of the world  (particularly  in U.S. banks  and  real  estate). 
This  was possible  because the central  bank  protected  a traditional  parity 
of 4.3 bolivars  per U.S. dollar  by selling  dollars  even as reserves were 
being  depleted  at a shocking  rate in 1981-82.  Indeed, the policy obtuse- 
ness is staggering:  the loss of reserves  was praised  by the central  bank's 
annual  report  as a way to restrain  domestic money growth  and thereby 
to keep down  domestic  inflation.  By 1983,  the private  sector  owned  more 
than $20 billion of foreign assets that had been recycled into the $26 
billion  of Venezuelan  public  foreign  borrowing.  When  foreign  lending  to 
the Venezuelan government  ceased in 1983  the economy staggered  as 
did  those in the rest of the hemisphere  in spite  of the offsetting  expatriate 
assets. 
What happened in Venezuela also occurred in varying degrees in 
Argentina,  Chile, and  Mexico, as Diaz-Alejandro  points out throughout 
the paper. In all these cases, the exchange rate was heavily supported 
by central  bank  policies, thereby  leading  to strong  currency  overvalua- 
tion and expectations of future  depreciation.  In Argentina  and Mexico 
these expectations translated  into a remarkably  large  capital  flight  that 
dramatically  intensified  the debt problem.  As Diaz-Alejandro's  table 9 
and  my table 1 suggest,  the capital  flight  in Mexico  alone  reached  perhaps 
$25  billion  from 1981  to mid-  1982. 
Hayek's concept of competition  among currencies  is helpful here.4 
His notion is that alternative  currencies and whole financial  systems 
across countries compete with each other based on the stability of 
purchasing  power  and  real  rates  of return  that  they  offer.  Under  a floating 
exchange  rate, the "losers" in this competition  depreciate,  while under 
a fixed exchange rate the central banks of the "losing" currencies 
provide the private sector a vehicle of escape into foreign assets. In 
1979,  when the U.S. dollar  started  on the path  of sharp  appreciation  and 
high  interest  rates, the ability  of the bolivar  or Mexican  peso to compete 
successfully  with the dollar  was greatly  undermined.  Remarkably,  some 
4.  See, for example,  F. von Hayek, "Choice  in Currency:  A Way  to Stop Inflation," 
Occasional  Paper  48 (Institute  of Economic Affairs, London, 1976).  Of course, Hayek 
welcomes the currency  competition,  whereas the discussion  in the text points out the 
dangers  to weak-currency  countries  of inviting  such  competition  through  liberalization  of 
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Table 1.  Five Latin American Economies Compared with Five Asian Economies, 
1979-82 
Annual  Apparentb 
Annual  real  current  Reala  capital 
GDP  Annual  account,  exchange  flight, 
growth,  inflation,  Terms  of  1979-82  rate,  1979-82 
1981-82  1979-82  trade, 1982  (percent  of  1979-81  (billions  of 
Country  (percent)  (percent)  (1978 =  100)  GNP)  (1978 =  100)  dollars) 
Latin  America 
Argentina  -5.6  130.5  103  -2.5  153  11.4 
Brazil  -0.3  83.6  61  -5.1  83  1.1 
Chile  -4.8  24.1  69  -9.7  114  0.9 
Mexico  3.6  32.0  112  -4.1  117  27.9 
Venezuela  0.2  14.8  164  2.1  108  20.9 
Average  -1.4  57.0  102  -3.9  115  62.2c 
Asia 
Korea  6.2  18.6  87  -6.4  99  0.8 
Malaysia  6.4  6.4  96  -5.1  93  n.a. 
Philippines  3.2  14.7  76  -6.4  105  0.2 
Sri Lanka  5.6  16.3  39  -11.4  100  -0.3 
Thailand  5.2  11.8  73  -6.1  100  -0.4 
Average  5.3  13.6  74  -7.1  99  0.3c 
Source:  Terms  of trade, U.N. Economic  Commission  for Latin America,  Economic  Survey of  Latin  America, 
1983, forthcoming.  Debt, World Bank and Bank for International  Settlements.  Other  data, IMF, International 
Financial  Statistics. 
a. The real  exchange  rate is calculated  as EP*IP,  where  E is the nominal  exchange  rate in units  of currency  per 
U.S. dollar,  P* is the U.S. consumer  price  index, and  P is the local-currency  CPI. 
b. Computed  as follows: apparent  capital  flight  equals observed  increase  in external  debt (public  plus private), 
minus  the increase  in official  foreign  exchange  revenues,  minus  the current  account  deficit  (cumulative),  plus the 
cumulative  net inflow  of foreign  direct  investment. 
c. Total. 
countries, such as Argentina,  Chile, and Mexico, actually  eased capital 
controls  at this time, making  the competition  even harsher.  Not surpris- 
ingly, fixed exchange rates proved untenable in countries with high 
inherited  inflation,  large  budget  deficits, and  weak financial  sectors. By 
1981-82, the private banking  sectors in Argentina,  Chile, and Mexico 
were largely  insolvent. 
The Asian economies listed in my table 1 avoided  the worst excesses 
of "competition"  with the U.S. dollar  for several reasons. In all cases 
the exchange  rate  was repeatedly  devalued  or  allowed  to float  downward 
to prevent an overvaluation  of the real exchange rate. In general, free 
convertibility  in U.S. dollars  was blocked by capital  controls. And the 
economies all had a background  of lower trend inflation,  which made 
locally denominated  assets at least adequate  stores of value. In the end, 
none  of the economies evidences any significant  degree  of capital  flight.' 
5. There  has apparently  been substantial  capital  flight  from  the Philippines  in the past 
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Table 2.  External Assets and Liabilities of U.S.  Banks 
Billions  of U.S. dollars 
Region  1978  1983  Change 
Latin  America and Caribbean 
Claims  on foreigners  57.6  188.9  131.3 
Liabilities  to foreigners  31.6  114.1  82.5 
Net  26.0  74.8  48.8 
Asiaa 
Claims  on foreigners  22.2  62.7  40.5 
Liabilities  to foreigners  29.0  45.4  16.4 
Net  - 6.8  17.3  24.1 
Source:  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  vol. 67 (December  1981),  pp. A60-61, and  vol. 70 (July  1984),  pp. A62-63. 
a. Net of Middle  East oil exporters. 
Note that the current  account deficits in the Asian countries were 
proportionately  as large  as, or even larger  than, those in Latin  America. 
The  difference  across countries  was not therefore  so much  in the current 
account  but  instead  in the capital  account  and  particularly  in the division 
between public and private capital. (A recent IMF study has similarly 
concluded that internal  fiscal and monetary  management,  rather  than 
external shocks, is most important  in separating  those countries that 
did and did not experience the need to renegotiate  foreign debt.)6  My 
table 2 shows this same point in a graphic  way. There we see the net 
position of U.S.  banks vis-a-vis the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, on one hand, and vis-a-vis the Asian countries  on the other. 
U.S. bank  net claims  on Latin  America  rose by $49  billion  between 1978 
and 1983, while net claims on the Asian countries  rose by $24 billion. 
The big difference  in the two regions, however, is not in the net claims 
but rather in the gross claims and liabilities. The U.S.  banks' gross 
liabilities  to Latin  America  rose by $83  billion  at the same  time  that  gross 
claims rose by  $131 billion. The banks provided a special sort of 
intermediation:  the private sectors of Latin America made offshore 
dollar  loans to the Latin  American  public  sectors. 
Although  the financial  differences  between Latin America  and Asia 
are crucial  in my view, I do not want to leave the impression  that they 
explain everything. Nor would Diaz-Alejandro  or Rudiger  Dornbusch 
let me do  so.  There are at least two points that need substantial 
6. See D. J. Donovan, "Sources  of External  Servicing  Difficulties"  (IMF,  December 
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qualification.  First, Brazil  hardly  fits the bill set out so far. Its system of 
exchange controls prevented  enormous  capital  flight  and the exchange 
rate was not grossly overvalued  (it is likely, though, that some capital 
flight  is hidden  in underinvoiced  exports and correspondingly  exagger- 
ated  current  account  deficits).  Brazil  does seem to fit  the more  traditional 
view of the debt crisis as outlined in the second section of Diaz- 
Alejandro's  paper. It suffered sharp terms of trade and interest rate 
shocks  during  1979-81,  which  it met  by reducing  savings  rather  than  real 
wages (the national savings rate fell from an average of 24.4 percent 
during  1970-78  to 18.2, 20.2, and 19.1 percent  in the next three years). 
By 1982  it was burdened  with the world's largest  external  debt and  thus 
not surprisingly  fell prey to the credit cutoff and financial  panic that 
emanated  from  Argentina  and  Mexico. Even though  Brazil  did  not suffer 
directly  from  capital  flight,  it probably  suffered  indirectly  by sharing  the 
cutoff in bank lending to Latin America since mid-1982.  The second 
point  refers  to the Asian  economies. One  significant  structural  difference 
between  Latin  America  and  Asia that  bears  emphasis  is the much  greater 
macroeconomic  openness of the Asian economies. While debt-GNP 
ratios are comparable  across the two groups  of countries, debt-export 
ratios  are  invariably  lower  in Asia. Thus,  creditors  will  naturally  perceive 
the likelihood of debt-servicing difficulties to be less for the Asian 
countries,  all other  things, such as debt-GNP  ratios, being  equal. 
Diaz-Alejandro  stresses the capital  flight  problem,  though  almost as 
an interesting  afterthought,  in the fourth  section of the paper,  where he 
addresses "public debt, private assets." He also has some important 
things  to say about the OECD role in restricting  tax havens and illegal 
capital flows.  What I find missing, however, is  a  more integrated 
macroeconomic  treatment  of the issue that investigates  the conditions 
under  which at least some of the capital  flight  could be reversed so that 
the existing public external  debt in dollars  could be partially  funded  as 
internal  debt in local currencies. Even a few billion dollars  of reverse 
capital  flow could greatly  brighten  the current  debt situation. 
Presumably,  capital  inflow  from  the private  sector can  be encouraged 
if the borrowing  countries' public  finances  are improved.  After all, the 
degree of confidence in the bolivar or peso depends on the market's 
judgment  as to the share of public debt that will be serviced via tax 
revenues, versus seignorage, versus currency  reform. The IMF focus 
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more  than  a ploy to improve  trade  balance  surpluses.  It is a crucial  step 
in permitting the long-term, noninflationary  servicing of  the Latin 
American public debt, which in turn is important  for restoring the 
private-sector  confidence  in local currency  assets. Where  I would  agree 
with Diaz-Alejandro  in criticizing  IMF  programs  is that  they have made 
insufficient  allowance  for the strong,  contractionary  real output  effects 
of the needed fiscal austerity.  Fiscal contraction  must  be coupled  with a 
realistic  plan  of real  exchange  rate  depreciation  so that  the loss of output 
in nontradables  is offset by increased production  of tradables. Fiscal 
contraction  without  real  exchange  rate  depreciation  causes huge  output 
losses  and does little to restore long-term confidence in the public 
finances. This is a lesson from Chile in the early 1980s. Chile actually 
achieved budget surpluses  in 1979  and 1980;  instead  of restoring  confi- 
dence, the budget policy contributed  to the enormous output decline 
after 1981. 
It remains to ask how much can be accomplished  by a package of 
fiscal contraction  and real exchange rate depreciation.  The paper  does 
discuss at length  the likely trade  balance  gains  from  a real  exchange  rate 
change, but I suspect that the econometric  estimates of those gains, in 
tables 12 and 13, are biased downward. Exports and imports should 
depend  not only on the real  exchange  rate  vis-a-vis  the United States, as 
in Diaz-Alejandro's  equations, but on the relative  price of tradables  to 
domestic wages, a factor which Diaz-Alejandro  ignores. I suspect that 
the supply effect of increased profitability  in exportables  goes a long 
way to explain why in 1984  Brazil's manufactured  exports are running 
68 percent higher  and Mexico's non-oil exports are 56 percent higher 
than  their 1983  levels.7 
Similarly, Diaz-Alejandro  does not mention the scope for import 
substitution  that is now present after several years of profit  squeeze in 
the import-competing  sector. In Venezuela, for example, the textile 
sector is now booming  at the free rate  of twelve bolivars  per U.S. dollar 
after  being  crushed  by imports  in the period  of the overvalued  currency. 
Import  penetration  in textiles has declined  from  about  70 percent  of the 
7. These data  refer  to the values of exports  for the first  four months  of 1984  over the 
same period in 1983. See W. R. Cline, "Current  Prospects  for International  Debt," in 
International  Debt: Systemic  Risk and Policy  Response  (Washington,  D.C.: Institute  for 
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domestic  market  to about 30 percent  in two years. This experience  will 
be replicated throughout  the region, and it would be useful to have 
estimates  of its importance  alongside  the projections  for export  growth. 
There is one more point in the paper  that warrants  comment. Diaz- 
Alejandro  makes several disparaging  references  to the credit  cartel  that 
now governs the international  capital  markets.  It is even christened  the 
"international  credit orderly marketing  arrangement."  I think these 
comments  miss their  mark.  For countries  with  unimpaired  creditworthi- 
ness,  such as in Asia, bank lending continues to be under highly 
competitive  terms. The focus of the cartel  is not the overall market  but 
only those countries  undergoing  debt  rescheduling,  as in Latin  America. 
In those cases, cartel behavior involves refinancing  of existing debts. 
The motivation of the cartel is to prevent individual  banks from free 
riding  on refinancing  by other  banks  instead  of imposing  monopoly  prices 
on new credit. The generous terms of Mexico's recent rescheduling 
make that point clearly. Thus Diaz-Alejandro's  call for a quick end to 
the credit  cartel  should  not be viewed as an  action  that  depends  basically 
on the banks but rather  on the debtors, since the need for a cartel will 
subside  once the free-rider  problem  in international  lending  is eliminated 
by improved  creditworthiness. 
General Discussion 
The role of exchange controls  and the prospects  for the return  of the 
private capital that had fled Latin America  provoked some sharp  dis- 
agreements.  Stanley  Fischer  contended  that  there  is no incentive  for the 
flight  capital  currently  invested in U.S. Treasury  bills to return,  partic- 
ularly  since it is unrecorded  by the home  authorities  and  is thus  not being 
taxed. He reasoned  it might  be appropriate  for the U.S. government  to 
provide  records  of ownership  to Latin  American  governments,  perhaps 
as a reward  to those countries  that get their current  accounts in order. 
Fischer  concluded  that  capital  controls  are necessary  for Latin  America 
in order  to keep capital  within  the region  when problems  arise. 
Henry  Wallich  disagreed,  arguing  that  flight  capital  might  well return 
and  that  exchange  controls  would  worsen  that  prospect.  Latin  Americans 
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even though  they have money abroad.  If the cost of borrowing  becomes 
high enough, the funds could flow back. But a necessary precondition 
for a return  of capital  is the assurance  that  the investor  can get back out 
again, without being blocked by exchange controls. Wallich  also rea- 
soned that informing  foreign governments of the ownership of U.S. 
securities  would only drive  that  capital  underground  and  not back  to the 
home country. Robert  Lawrence  agreed  that flight  capital  could return 
to Latin  America  given the proper  incentives. These included  freeing  up 
domestic interest rates to  make returns attractive and establishing 
realistic  exchange  rates so the exchange  risk  did not inhibit  investment. 
Jeffrey  Sachs replied  that if exchange rates were allowed to float, or at 
least government  interventions  were minimized  so that exchange  rates 
were allowed to fluctuate  more  freely during  a crisis, there  would  be no 
need for the exchange  controls  that  Fischer  advocated. 
Diaz-Alejandro  supported  Fischer's remedy of exchange controls. 
He asserted  that,  for  Latin  America,  credible  monetary  and  fiscal  policies 
are  necessary  but  by themselves  are  not enough  to eliminate  speculative 
flows and that  freely fluctuating  exchange  rates are simply  not credible. 
He noted that exchange controls exist in most European  countries  and 
argued  that Latin American  countries  need to have exchange controls 
in place so that  they can be enforced  in a time of crisis. 
Rudiger  Dornbusch  endorsed  Paul  Krugman's  proposal  that  the IMF 
programs  to the Latin  American  countries  should  put  more  emphasis  on 
expenditure-switching  policies than on the traditional  remedy of ex- 
penditure-reduction  policies. Brazilian  non-oil  imports  have fallen  by 60 
percent  since 1980,  and  investment  goods accounted  for only 25 percent 
of that reduction. In Dornbusch's opinion, these figures reveal the 
versatility of Brazilian producers in producing  import substitutes in 
response to the favorable  exchange-rate  depreciation.  The best growth 
policy for the Latin  American  countries  in the face of a foreign  exchange 
constraint  is to control imports through  quotas, tariffs and an import 
authority  "who loses the application  forms," in order  to induce  growth 
of import-competing  industries.  James Duesenberry  questioned  Dorn- 
busch's proposals because many of the present troubles of the less 
successful developing countries are due to past policies of import 
substitution.  Import  substitution  may be a tempting  short-run  remedy 
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increased by being saddled with hothouse industries. Diaz-Alejandro 
agreed  with Dornbusch  that there is room for import  substitution,  but 
he argued that the desirability  of import substitution  depends on the 
mechanisms  used to induce  it. A vexing  problem  with  import  substitution 
is that  it often comes at the expense of export-led  growth,  which history 
has shown to be more  productive  in the long run. 